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ABSTRACT
Nonpoint source pollution is recognized as the primary cause of water pollution in
the United States and has many adverse environmental effects in other areas such as
Europe and China. In this dissertation research, I examine the role of information in
managing nonpoint source pollution through voluntary programs and regulatory
policies. Specifically, I look into the effect of informational nudges, information
appealing to people to act, and financial incentives to reduce nonpoint source pollution
through behavioral changes. Also, I investigate the impact of information on nonpoint
source polluters’ behavior under the ambient-based policy when the environmental
uncertainty exists at the individual level, and the information about other polluters’
action vary. We use three methods to study the impact of information on nonpoint
source polluters' behavior: a randomized field experiment, a controlled laboratory
experiment, and one integrated agent-based model. We test the following general
hypotheses: (1) Informational nudges affect nonpoint source polluters’ behavior, but the
effect is not persistent when we combine informational nudges with financial incentives
to affect behavior. (2) Decreased environmental uncertainty leads to more efficient
allocation of abatement efforts across nonpoint source polluters and better social
efficiency under the ambient-based policy. (3) Under the ambient-based policy,
different levels of environmental uncertainty and the ability to obtain information about
other polluters’ actions affect nonpoint source polluters’ learning pattern and
equilibrium behavior.
I find that informational nudges and financial incentives both work to change
behavior, but they may substitute each other, especially when the financial incentive is

small. The ambient-based policy is effective when uncertainty levels vary, but
eliminating environmental uncertainty leads to less pollution. Different levels of
environmental uncertainty and information disclosure induce different learning patterns
of nonpoint source polluters. The agent-based model shows that high degrees of
uncertainty lead to behavioral differences in the long run given the agents can observe
other group members’ behavior.
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PREFACE
I use the manuscript format for this dissertation which consists of three manuscripts
and appendices. The composition of three manuscripts follows the requirement of a
specific journal. The goal of this thesis is to understand the role of information in
managing nonpoint source pollution through voluntary programs and regulatory
policies.
The first manuscript report results of a randomized field experiment which we use
to investigate the performances of informational nudges and financial incentives to
change homeowners’ behavior when they manage their lawns.
The second manuscript uses a laboratory experiment to examine nonpoint source
polluters’ behavior under the ambient-based policies when the environmental
uncertainty exists at the individual level, and the information sets provided to the
experimental subjects vary.
The third manuscript looks into nonpoint source polluters’ learning patterns using
an experience weighted attraction learning model. We build up an agent-based model
in which we calibrate the agents with parameters from the learning model to scale up
the findings from the experiment in the second manuscripts.
A conclusion chapter follows the third manuscript. It summarizes all the three
manuscripts, policy implications of this dissertation study, and point out directions for
future research.
The appendices include a survey and other materials we used to collect data for the
first manuscript and an experimental instruction for conducting the experiment in the
second and third manuscripts.
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MANUSCRIPT-1
The effect of informational nudges and financial incentives to reduce nonpoint
source pollution: A randomized controlled trial
To be Submitted to Environmental and Resource Economics, under first round of
revision
by
Haoran Miao a, Simona Trandafir a, Emi Uchida a, and Michael Price b
a

Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island, Kinston, RI
b

University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL

Abstract
Policymakers often use voluntary programs to control nonpoint source pollution from
residential lawns. We run a field experiment to test whether informational nudges and
financial incentives can motivate residents to choose green-certified lawn care services
voluntarily. We find that informational nudges spur voluntary behavior conditionally.
However, financial incentives, especially a small one, to encourage behavior do not
reinforce the effect of the informational nudges. Our evidence shows that the informational
nudges and the financial incentives are substitutes. These findings are potentially important
for state and federal agencies as well as advocacy groups interested in promoting best
management practices.

JEL Classification: C93, Q25, Q53, D03

Keywords: Nonpoint source pollution, voluntary program, informational nudges,
financial incentives, and field experiment
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1.1 Introduction
Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution is recognized as the primary cause of water
pollution in the United States [EPA, 2007] and has many adverse environmental effects in
other areas such as Europe [EEA, 2007] and China [Sun et al., 2012]. It is difficult to
control NPS pollution due to its diffuse nature and resulting information asymmetries
between an environmental regulator and the agents who contribute to the NPS pollution
problem [Xepapadeas, 2011]. To internalize external environmental damages caused by
NPS pollution and circumvent the information problems, there are standard regulatory
policy instruments such as input tax [Griffin and Bromley, 1982], ambient-based
instrument [Segerson, 1988] and random punishment [Alpízar et al., 2004]. Theoretically,
they are promising to alter behavior that would inhibit good water quality. However little
progress on NPS pollution regulation has been made, at least in the United States, because
of various barriers, including significant political barriers [Craig and Roberts, 2015], few
experimental designs and heterogeneity of spatial and temporal scales for behaviors and
measured outcomes [Rissman and Carpenter, 2015].
Currently, local, state, and federal initiatives in the United States mainly take the
voluntary approach to stimulate behavior change to reduce NPS pollution. For example,
farmers in the agricultural area are encouraged to adopt pollution control through local,
state and federal financial supports [Shortle et al., 2012]. Residents in the urban and
suburban area often encounter education campaigns which nudge people to take voluntary
behavior to reduce polluted runoff. Appeals such as “water and fertilizer your lawn
properly,” “leave clips on your lawn” and “use a rain barrel” frequently appear in those
programs [e.g., Eisenhauer et al., 2010; Bakacs et al., 2013]. From a broader point of view,
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policymakers all over the world widely favor the use of voluntary approaches as a way to
improve environmental qualities [Segerson, 2013]. Though treated as second-best
instruments, voluntary approaches can be cost-effective in encouraging conservation and
environment protection with thoughtful designs. Successful examples of those designs
include payments for ecosystem services schemes under which landowners are paid for
implementing conservation practices [e.g., Ferraro and Kiss, 2002], or unilateral initiatives
under which polluters take voluntary actions to reduce pollution [e.g., Ahmed and Segerson
2011].
Inspired by these voluntary programs, we conduct a randomized controlled field
experiment to examine whether on so-called “green nudges” [Schubert, 2017], can promote
voluntary behavior to reduce NPS pollution from residential lawns. We also test whether
informational nudges spur subjects’ non-pecuniary motivation such as moral costs [Levitt
and List, 2007] in NPS pollution settings and lead to an increase in demand for green
services. To do so, we impose a cross-randomized treatment in which respondents receive
financial incentives to cover a portion of the upfront cost of buying green services. We
postulate that in the field experiment financial incentives can also stimulate the demand for
green services as the informational nudges can, but it may crowd out the demand nudged
by the information.
Although there are many sources of NPS pollution, household lawn fertilization
represents one of the causes of water quality degradation in many regions [EPA, 2005].
According to Milesi et al. [2005], co-authored by NASA scientists, lawns now cover an
area larger than any irrigated agricultural crop in the U.S. As the runoff moves away from
the residential area, it carries pollutants, such as excessive nutrients and pesticides from
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lawns, and deposits them into receiving waterbodies. Household lawn fertilization is
significant nitrogen inputs in the urban waterways [Hobbie et al., 2016]. With proper lawn
care, residents can reduce the negative impact of runoff from lawns, however [Spence et
al., 2013]. State and local agencies in the United States have mostly relied on education
programs and extension campaigns to send information to homeowners and nudge them to
voluntarily adopt best management practices (BMPs) on private lawns [e.g., Dietz, 2004;
Kelly et al., 2012; Bakacs et al., 2013]. Although understanding the effectiveness of these
education and extension programs on the adoption of BMPs is important to policymakers,
one difficulty in measuring the outcomes of those programs is the researchers’ inability to
observe the subjects’ lawn care behavior, such as mowing the lawns high or reducing
fertilizer use. Thus, the leading metrics to measure the success of these programs have been
based on households’ stated preferences in interviews or surveys towards BMP adoption
[e.g., Dietz, 2004; Ballentine, 2005].
In this study, we advance the literature by examining how such information can
nudge homeowners to choose lawn care companies that provide lawn care BMPs in the
field experiment. We develop the experiment around a new certification program by the
Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (RIDEM) which green-certifies
the lawn care businesses that commit to a list of BMPs. Specifically, we test how
information nudges affect homeowners’ decisions to adopt green-certified lawn care
contracts. We also give real financial incentives randomly to a portion of homeowners by
offering rebates for green-certified lawn care contracts to check the interaction effects of
financial incentives and information nudges on homeowners’ choices of green-certified
lawn care contracts.
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We partnered with the local green-certified lawn care industry to run the experiment
and recruited residents in the area serviced by the green-certified companies as research
subjects. From the experiment, we obtain three indicators to measure the impact of
informational nudges and financial incentives on promoting voluntary behavior: (i)
homeowners’ stated WTP for green-certified lawn contracts; (ii) reported willingness to
hire green-certified lawn companies based on a Likert scale; and (iii) information
acquisition requirements which mean that the respondents leave their contact details (their
names, email addresses, and phone numbers) to the green-certified lawn care companies to
get contacted, including free estimates. Ideally, we would use the uptake of contracts as the
outcome of interest. However, we were not able to collect sufficient data to test the effects
on contract uptake. We examine the three indicators above as alternative outcomes. 1
However, we claim that the third indicator of whether or not the subject left their contact
information is a significant departure from the existing literature because leaving private
information can be considered a costly action.
We hypothesize that the informational nudges add a premium to the WTP for the
green-certified lawn care contracts, increase the stated likelihood to hire a green-certified
lawn care company and motivate more people to take the first step towards an
environmentally friendly lawn care practice. Financial incentives would have a similar
effect to the informational nudges on the reported probability to hire and motivating people
to take action. However, when we implement them together, there may be the crowd-out

1

We have several conjectures why the uptake was small. First, the companies had limited resources to reach
out to the subjects who were interested in the green-certified contracts. For subjects who provided contact
information for the lawn care companies, we passed on the information to the three companies and they were
then responsible for the negotiation with the homeowners, but a substantial portion of the homeowners were
never reached. Second, we did not conceal the information who got the financial incentives to the lawn care
companies. They gave quotes to homeowners strategically. For example, they priced their services higher
given the potential customers received financial incentives.
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effect. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to use a field experiment to
evaluate the effect of informational nudges using both stated preferences and revealed
preferences together at the specific settings.
We find that in our study, on average, the respondents in the informational nudge
treatment group state a significantly larger WTP for green-certified lawn care contracts,
but this premium nudging by the information diminishes as the cost of the lawn care
increases. When we restrict the samples to those who report that they are likely to contract
with green-certified lawn care companies, the nudging premium is still positive but not
statistically significant; the decreasing trend over the cost still exists but not statistically
significant either.
We also find that the informational nudges and a high financial incentive
significantly increase the reported likelihood to seek green-certified lawn contracts.
However, a low financial incentive alone seems to have limited effect on the respondents’
Likert Scales of hiring a green certified lawn care company and adding financial incentives
over does not statistically significantly increase the stated likelihood after we show the
informational nudges to the respondents.
The informational nudges have a significant effect on nudging people to take the
first step to ask for free estimations from the green-certified lawn care companies. Financial
incentives are also great instruments to nudge behavior, but we find evidence that shows
financial incentives and the informational nudges substitute each other. Only a high
financial incentive can induce a significantly greater treatment effect compared to the
nudge-only instrument.
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We organize the article as follows: Section 2 goes through some related literature.
Section 3 presents the experiment design and the data collection process. Section 4
formulates the detailed results. Section 5 states our conclusions and recommendations.

1.2 Literature review
Nudge theory is a concept in behavioral science and economics which has been
widely applied since the seminal book “Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth,
and happiness” by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein [2008]. They define nudges as
“any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way
without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.".
Schubert [2017] raises an idea about “green nudges” and considers it as “nudges that aim
at promoting environmentally benign behavior.”. However, since the exact definition of
nudges is somewhat controversial and there is no strict line between nudges and incentives
[Hansen, 2016], we use “informational nudges” and “financial incentives” to differentiate
the two kinds of treatments in our study. The first treatment offers information, while the
second treatment provides financial incentives to homeowners to nudge the purchasing
behavior of green-certified lawn contracts.
Information can affect people’s wiliness to pay for market goods. Depositario et al.
[2009] find that WTP bids for golden rice are higher under positive information than no
information, negative information and two-sided information scenario. Rousseau and
Vranken [2011] demonstrate that the provision of information on the actual environmental
and health effects of organic apple production increases consumers’ price premium. One
study by Aldrovandi et al. [2015] shows that exposing people to two different types of
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information about how their consumption is ranking creates an over 30% WTP gap for
healthy food. Consumers even react to the information provided by eco-labeling. For
example, Stemle et al. [2016] find that Marine Stewardship Council certification
significantly improves ex-vessel prices of some fishes.
Information can also nudge consumers’ behavior change. For example, according
to the study by Mathios [2000], people significantly consume fewer salad dressings with
very high-fat levels after producers were mandatorily required to disclose nutritional
content by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act. Bertrand & Morse [2011] show that
information showing the adding-up effect of loan fees over several pay cycles helps people
overcome cognitive bias and results in 11% less borrowing in the subsequent four months.
There are also a handful of field experiments conducted to test the impact of informational
nudges on quantity and quality of people's energy consumption. For instance, Allott [2011]
reports that, on average, consumers reduce 2% energy consumption when nudged by the
Home Energy Report letters which display the comparison of their electricity use to that of
their neighbors.
Nevertheless, the effect of informational nudges on behavior is highly contextdependent, and the effect of different types of information varies. Fellner et al. [2011] run
a field experiment in Austria to test the effectiveness of various normative messages sent
to potential evaders of TV license fees. While the “threat” treatment which makes a high
detection risk salient is useful, neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about
others’ behavior induces significant behavior change. Costa & Kahn [2013] find that the
informational nudges could have an adverse effect for some political conservatives who
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may increase their electricity consumption only because they resent the reports that link
their behavior to that of their neighbors’.
When we couple the informational nudges with the financial incentives, the effect
is even more complicated. The tension between intrinsic motivation (which can derive from
informational nudges) and extrinsic incentives (which might be offered by external agents)
is well known among the growing bodies of field experiment literature [e.g., Alpízar and
martinsson, 2011; Lacetera et al., 2012;]. The recent research by Pellerano et al., [2016]
uses both intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation to induce consumers’ energy
conservation, and they detect a backfire of extrinsic motivation in their experiment.
Extrinsic motivation may have a crowding-out effect especially when incentives are small.
However, as Gneezy et al. [2011] argue a large incentive may have a stronger price effect
than the crowding-out effect so that it can promote conservation in the short run. Our study
serves as field evidence of this argument in NPS pollution voluntary programs settings,
and our experiment design can also test for the potential crowding-out effect of financial
incentives.
Many differences exist between lawn care contracts and standard market goods
such as healthy food, electricity or drinking water even there are markets for lawn care
contracts. We do believe those differences affect the outcomes of the survey. For example,
households have different sizes of lawns which may result in very different stated WTP for
green-certified lawn care; or some households might have good relationships with lawn
care companies they previously contracted with which may affect their decision to switch
to a green-certified one. Thus, we also record lawn care practices and individual
characteristics in the experiment. By controlling those components as other literature does,
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we expect to improve the precision of the treatment effect estimation. Furthermore, we
collect two pieces of unique personal information from the respondents echoing the
literature that shows the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale and the Self-Report
Altruism (SRA) Scale are good predictors of pro-social behavior. The NEP Scale is an
estimate of endorsement of pro-environmental attitudes [Dunlap et al., 2000] and the SRA
Scale is a measure of altruistic personality [Rushton et al., 1981]. In the online survey
conducted by Attari et al. [2016], for example, people’s pro-social actions have a strong
correlative relationship with the NEP Scale. The research by Otto and Bolle [2011] shows
that the SRA Scale is related to the charity giving, but not to the blood donation behavior.

1.3 Experiment design and data collection
1.3.1 Experiment design
We conduct the research in Rhode Island and neighboring counties in southern
Massachusetts and western Connecticut. This area is one of the most densely populated in
the United States and has high fractional turfgrass coverage [Milesi et al., 2015]. The
urbanization process is still active. When land is transformed for urban and suburban usage,
a lawn is often planted as ground cover on open spaces attached to houses and buildings
[Jenkins, 2015]. The importance of neighborhood appearance and concern for aesthetics
drive residents to water and fertilize lawns frequently and use other practices to care for
their lawns [Nielson and Smith, 2005]. Significant NPS pollution is generated from those
lawn care practices, and it is recognized as one of the causes of water quality impairments
in some area [e.g., RIDEM, 2015].
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In 2015, RIDEM started the program to green-certify lawn care companies who
adopt BMPs to reduce their environmental impact when managing residential lawns. The
green-certified lawn care companies fulfill a menu of BMPs covering a range of activities
focusing on efficient turf management and water conservation. They protect environmental
quality by reducing the source of pollution, conserve water and other natural resources and
contribute to the sustainability of lawn care. Green-certified lawn care companies need to
adopt additional best management practices to get re-certified every two years. Although
it is the smallest state in the United States, Rhode Island has about 400 lawn care businesses
according to RIDEM. Only ten lawn care companies (about 2.5%) were green-certified as
of January 2017.
The green certification program by RIDEM is a good example of the state-level
effort to reduce NPS pollution by promoting voluntary “green services” from the supply
side. Lawn care companies’ behavior varies largely when managing residential lawns [Law
et al., 2004]. According to meeting memos with lawn care professionals in Rhode Island,
those who pursue this green-certification want to fulfill social responsibility and also hope
that the green-certification will bring customers for their business. Apparently, if more
customers adopt lawn care contracts because of the green certification, more lawn care
companies will react to the signal and minimize their environmental impact. As a side goal,
we conduct the experiment to find good ways to endorse and publicize green-certification.
We partnered with a state-wide professional landscape association [the Rhode
Island Nursery and Landscape Association (RINLA)] and three green-certified landscaping
companies to run the experiment. In contrast to measuring homeowners’ direct supply of
BMPs as outcomes in regular voluntary programs to control NPS pollution, we estimate
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their indirect supply through contracting with green-certified lawn care companies in this
study which is more observable.
We test the effect of two general treatments in the experiment to promote the greencertified lawn care contracts: informational nudges and financial incentives. The test
treatments are varied between participants in a general two-by-two design (see Table 1.1,
column 1, 2 and 3) and implemented in a structured survey coded in Qualtrics, an online
survey software. Respondents of the survey are all exposed to the introduction of greencertified lawn care companies, and two-thirds of them are randomly chosen to receive the
informational nudges treatment. We introduce a cross-randomized incentive treatment after
the first randomization of information. Three-quarters of respondents receive financial
incentives randomly, and one-quarter of them receive none. To differentiate the effect of
different informational nudges and different level of financial incentives, we implement
two types of nudges and two levels of incentives in the experiment (see Table 1.1, column
4, 5 and 6 for more details).
The subjects are first introduced to RIDEM’s Green Certification Program and the
green-certified lawn care companies (page 130, Appendix I). The first segment introduces
the history of the green certification program and some BMPs conducted by lawn care
companies using bullet points. The second segment reinforces the contents of the bullet
points using an infographic developed for this experiment by a professional designer. The
third segment attaches a few reputable sources about BMPs for lawn care practices from
three state universities (the University of Massachusetts, the University of Connecticut and
the University of Rhode Island). Based on results of the report about lawn care behavior
[Eisenhauer et al., 2010], we design another infographic (Nudge 1) that contains the salient

12

information about the relationship between lawn care practices and water quality. We
vision that salient information would increase homeowners’ moral cost and thus change
their behavior. We display Nudge 1 to all the respondents who are in the general
informational nudges treatment group. The information such as “Runoff flows into aquatic
habitats, where, just like your lawn, fertilizer makes plants grow. However, too much
growth can lead to not enough oxygen in the water, killing fish and other aquatic lives.” is
shown in the infographic of Nudge 1. We also design another infographic (Nudge 2) that
displays the information about how many the respondents’ neighbors choose to have greencertified lawn care contracts in 2016 based on the statistics we obtain from RINLA. We
hypothesize that social comparison can also change homeowners’ behavior. Half of the
respondents in the general informational nudges treatment group are exposed to Nudge 2
randomly. (See the survey in Appendix I for more details about the introduction of the
certification programs and green-certified lawn care companies and infographics for
informational nudges.)
Two levels of financial incentives are designed and distributed to the respondents
randomly. A low financial incentive covers twenty-five percent of a typical green-certified
lawn care contract of which the average value is $300 according to RINLA, while a high
financial incentive covers half of the contract. Due to the limited budget, we cap the low
financial incentive to $75 and the high financial incentive to $150. Two-thirds of the
respondents who are in the general financial incentive group receive the low financial
incentive randomly, and one-third of them are randomly exposed to the high financial
incentive.
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1.3.2 Survey Design and data collection
The survey contains five parts. The first part of the survey includes screening
questions which ensure the respondents are eligible. An eligible respondent must have his
or her house properties in Rhode Island and some areas in Massachusetts and Connecticut.
We include areas in the other two states because Rhode Island has small geographical area
and many lawn care companies have potential customers there. Also, the respondent must
be responsible for making decisions on lawn maintenance. We also exclude those
households that hired green-certified lawn care companies in 2016 from our survey. The
second part begins with a consent form. In the consent form, we state the affiliation and
the purpose of the survey. We include a short description and expected time that the
respondents may take to finish all the questions. We embed some clarification requested
by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Rhode Island in the consent
form. If the respondents agree all the statements in the consent form, they may continue to
answer the survey. The rest of part two asks the respondents questions about lawn
characteristics and lawn management practices in 2016.
We display the information about green-certified lawn care companies and the
informational nudges in the third part of the survey. One-third of the respondents receive
Nudge 1 randomly, and another third receive Nudge 1 and Nudge 2 together. We ask the
WTP for green-certified lawn care contracts after the nudge randomization is over. The
fourth part of the survey is the randomization of giving away incentives. The Likert scale
question about their willingness to obtain services from one green-certified lawn care
companies is asked based on different combination of the informational nudges and
financial incentives. The Likert scale has six levels for this question, from “extremely
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unlikely” to “extremely likely”. At the end of the fourth part, we ask the respondents
whether or not they are interested in receiving more information from the three greencertified lawn care companies that collaborate with us. If they are interested, we then ask
the respondents for permission to send their contact details to the three green-certified lawn
care professionals. Demographic questions including gender, age, education, and income
and the question matrices to tease out the respondents’ NEP Scale and SRA Scale comprise
the fifth part of the survey.
The NEP Scale is designed to gauge the environmental concern of people using a
survey instrument constructed of fifteen statements. The survey instrument includes the
statement such as “we are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can
support.” or the statement “ if things continue on their present course, we will soon
experience a major ecological catastrophe.”. We ask the respondents whether they agree
or disagree those statements, and they answer the questions by choosing from seven levels
from “completely disagree” to “completely agree”. We assign a value of zero to
“completely disagree” and a value of six to “completely agree”. The NEP Scale equals the
average of the values of the fifteen statements.
The SRA Scale is designed to measure people’s altruistic tendency by letting people
self-report the frequency with which they engage in 20 altruistic acts primarily toward
strangers. Respondents report the frequencies of the acts on a five-point scale ranging from
“never” to “very often”. A value of zero is assigned to “never” and a value of four for “very
often”. The SRA Scale equals the summation of the values of the 20 acts.
We conducted four sessions of focus groups to make sure the respondents
understand our survey questions. Group participants were recruited from Craigslist and
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compensated with $40 for their time. Eligible participants were those who were over 18
years of age, had a lawn and were responsible for its maintenance. We conducted all focus
groups at the Robert L. Carothers Library of the University of Rhode Island. During the
focus groups, the participants were asked to take the survey first and then provide us with
their feedback. On average, the participants spent 19 minutes to finish the survey.
Questions such as “Are there any questions that are not clear?” or “What is the message of
this infographic?” were asked in the guided feedback session following the completion of
the survey. Participants ‘comments and suggestions were then used to improve the survey,
whenever appropriate. We also sent the survey to outreach personnel at University of
Rhode Island and lawn care professionals for further opinions. The survey was officially
distributed to the respondents at the end of February 2017 and was supposed to conclude
by the end of March 2017. However, due to inclement weather and the subsequent delay
of lawn care season, we extended the survey closing date until April 15th.
The survey was coded in Qualtrics and distributed electronically. The survey
respondents were recruited through two channels: Qualtrics panel and local organizations’
email listservs2. Qualtrics use by the invitation-only online panel recruitment methods to
avoid self-selection and professional survey takers. Thus many researchers utilize it to
recruit subjects for their studies [Brandon et al., 2013]. Our survey was also distributed to
the respondents by local schools, environmental organizations and local newspapers. We
reached out to school district superintendents, school principals, directors of environmental
organizations and newspapers and representatives of city governments to communicate the
availability to distribute the survey to their email listservs. Five schools, twelve

2

Our study did not reach the sample size needed based on power calculation, however.
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environmental organizations, one local online newspaper and one city hall, agreed and
managed to post our survey on their newsletters sending to their audiences routinely. The
research team created advertisements for recruiting respondents and made minor changes
according to volunteer organizations’ requests. We offered a $2 Amazon gift card to any
respondent who finished our survey as a small thank-you gift. The respondents could obtain
the gift cards by signing their names and leaving email addresses. They could also choose
to donate the gift cards to the organization that sent them our survey. We attach a full list
of those organizations in Appendix II. We also include one example advertisement in
Appendix III.3
Survey data were downloaded from Qualtrics and updated in our internal database
twice per week (Monday and Thursday) during the survey period. The research team
routinely checked the data, sent out the Amazon gift cards and forwarded interested
respondents’ information to lawn care companies. We collected 1,736 answered surveys in
total, 1,000 of these from the Qualtrics panel and 736 from schools and local organizations’
email listservs. It is worth mentioning that the 1,736 completed surveys may not contain
all the variables in this study. It is due to URI IRB regulation that requests that all questions
except the screening questions are optional in the survey and the respondents may skip any
questions they want.

1.4 Results
We use three outcome variables to measure the impact of informational nudges and
financial incentives on nudging behavior: WTP for green-certified lawn care contracts,

3

The survey procedure, focus group and all related materials that were shown to the respondents, including
the survey itself, were approved by the IRB at the University of Rhode Island.
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Likert scale to hire one green-certified lawn care companies and choices to leave
information to the three green-certified lawn care companies. Control variables include
household lawn care characteristics and respondents’ individual characteristics. Table 1.2
lists the descriptive statistics of key variables of this study. We start by reporting the results
of the respondents’ stated WTP.
1.4.1 The informational nudges and the stated WTP
The average WTP (Median = $200, Mean = $423.92, N = 1030) stated by the
respondents in the informational nudges treatment group is higher than the average
(Median = $200, Mean = $416.61, N = 522) in the control group. However, the Student tTest (p = 0.88) does not reject the null hypothesis that the two means are indifferent with
each other and Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p = 0.36) does not reject its null hypothesis either.
Since many factors can affect the WTP, such as lawn acreages or lawn management efforts,
which may confound the treatment effect, we specify regression models to control those
potential factors and identify confounders if any.
Looking into the data, we find that lawn care spending is a good predictor of the
stated WTP. Also, we observe zero WTP values for a significant fraction (17.43% in the
control group, 15.34% in the informational nudge treatment group). Thus, we first set up a
TOBIT regression model, with the cost in 2016 and experimental design variables as
independent variables. An interaction term between the cost variable and the nudge dummy
variable is also included to check whether the hypothesized WTP premium nudging by the
salient information is affixed to the previous year’s lawn care spending. The first column
of Table 1.3 presents the results of this TOBIT model. It seems informational nudges can
increase the WTP significantly (p < 10%) when spending on lawn care is not too high on
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the lawn care. However, the statistically significant negative slope for the interaction term
indicates that this premium diminishes as the spending increases. The effect of the
informational nudges could be negative when the spending is high enough. The NEP Scale
and the SRA Scale is added to the TOBIT model to check whether the two individual
characteristics well predict the WTP. We do not find that the two variables statistically
significantly affect the WTP. The effect of informational nudges on the WTP still holds (p
< 5%), even in the third model in which we add all other lawn characteristics and individual
characteristics as explanatory variables. (Other variables, such as income and the variable
indicating whether households hired lawn care companies to manage their lawn have
significant effects on the WTP. However, they are not the focuses of the paper, and we do
not report the results on Table 1.3.)
Nevertheless, the informational nudges do not affect the WTP statistically
significantly after we restrict the observations to a portion of the sample. In the fourth
regression model (N = 675), we drop the WTP observations if the respondents state that
they are slightly unlikely, moderately unlikely or extremely unlikely to hire green-certified
lawn care companies. We can observe that informational nudges still have a positive effect
and their interaction with the cost slopes down, but the coefficients of the two variables are
not significant anymore (fourth column of Table 1.3). It suggests that some respondents
might be nudged to state high WTP even they are not likely to obtain contracts. It also
indicates that the hypothetical WTP premium for informational nudges in our survey may
have a gap between the actual one.
Taken together, we find that the informational nudges can increase people’s
hypothetical WTP to for green-certified lawn care contract. However, the effect of the
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nudges might be different from person to person. Evidence even shows that the
informational nudges might lower people’s WTP when their lawn care bill is supposed to
be high. We apply the same analysis to figure out the possible different treatment effects
between offering Nudge 1 only and offering Nudge 1 and Nudge 2 together. However, no
significant differences are detected.
1.4.2 The informational nudges, financial incentives and stated Likert scales
The Likert scales to hire the green-certified lawn care companies are used to
measure the effect of informational nudges and financial incentives together. As stated
before, we asked the Likert scales question after the respondents randomly received the
financial incentives. The Likert scales have six levels, and we assign a value of one to the
Likert scales if they state that they are extremely unlikely to hire green-certified lawn care
companies and a value of six for extremely likely.
We first run a Pearson’s Chi-square test the independence between informational
nudges and the Likert scales. The result rejects the hypothesis that the two variables are
independent of each other at 10% level (χ2= 11.02, p = 0.051). Surprisingly, the Chi-Square
test for the independence between financial incentives (= 1 if any incentives are given) and
the Likert scales do not reject the null hypothesis (χ2= 1.99, p = 0.85). We further replace
the financial incentives variable with another categorical one, which assigns value zero to
the no incentive group, value one to low incentive group and value two to high incentive
group, in the test. Its result reject the hypothesis at 10% level (χ2= 16.79, p = 0.08),
however. We conjecture that the two types of financial incentives may have different
effects in the stated Likert Scales. Thus, in the following regression analysis, we
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differentiate the financial incentives as the low financial incentive and the high financial
incentive.
We use ordered logistic regressions (OLOGIT) to estimate the treatment effect of
the informational nudges and the financial incentives since our dependent variables are
ordered categorical variables and our data meet all the assumptions of ordered logistic
models. We first run the regression with the design variables as independent variables,
including the interaction terms of the two treatment variables and the variable defining the
recruitment channels. The results of the first model (column 1, Table 1.4a) indicates the
stated likelihood to hire a green-certified lawn care companies is statistically significantly
higher (p < 0.01) in the groups presented with the high financial incentive, the
informational nudges, and the interaction of informational nudge and the high financial
incentive than in the group with no financial incentives and no nudges. However,
presenting the low financial incentive alone does not change the likelihood statistically
significant. The coefficient of the interaction term of the low financial incentive and the
informational nudges is only significant at 10% level (p = 0.051), which indicates that the
low financial incentive may crowd out the likelihood crowded in by the informational
nudges. Interestingly, it seems the stated likelihood from the respondents recruited from
the Qualtrics panel is higher than that reported by the respondents recruited from the local
organizations’ email listservs.
We further added the NEP Scale and the SRA Scale into the second model as
explanatory variables. Both variables have statistically significant effects (p < 0.01, column
2, Table 1.4a) on the stated likelihood. The results are robust when we add lawn care
characteristics and the other individual characteristics into the third and fourth models
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(column 3 and column 4, Table 1.4a). The effects of high incentive and the informational
nudges also persist with more independent variables according to Table 1.4a.
We present marginal effects comparison of six interactions of the informational
nudges and the financial incentives in Table 1.4b based on the fourth OLOGIT model. The
baseline is no informational nudges and no financial incentives. The results show that the
informational nudges, the financial incentives, and their interactions statistically
significantly decrease the respondents’ probabilities of choosing “extremely unlikely” and
“moderately unlikely” and increase the chances of answering “slightly likely”, “moderately
likely” and “extremely likely”. For example, the sampled respondents are 10% less likely
to report that they are extremely unlikely hire green-certified companies if the
informational nudges are presented (the third cell of column 1 in Table 1.4b). The sampled
respondents are about 4% more likely to state that they are extremely likely to hire greencertified companies if we provide them the informational nudges and the high incentive
(the sixth cell of column 6). Conducting more pairwise comparisons between marginal
effects of interactions of the informational nudges and the informational nudges, we find
systemic differences in the effects of the financial incentives conditional on the presence
of the informational nudges. When we do not show the informational nudges to the
respondents, three level of incentives (no incentive, low incentive, high incentive) have
statistically significantly different marginal effects with each other. The results coincide
with the neo-classical economic model predictions in that more incentives induce fewer
people to choose Likert Scale 1 – 2 and more people to choose Likert Scale 4 – 6. However,
when we reveal the informational nudges, the levels of incentives do not have statistically
significant margins effects at any Likert Scale (1-6) at 5% level.
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Based on the results of Tables 1.4a and 1.4b, we conclude that the informational
nudges and the financial incentives increase the respondents’ stated likelihood to hire
green-certified lawn care companies and the size of the financial incentives matter.
Predicted marginal effects tell us that the financial incentives do not play a significant role
in the respondents’ stated likelihood to hire green certified lawn care companies when they
are exposed the informational nudges. Also, people who are more environmentally friendly
and altruistic are more likely to show interests in the green-certified lawn care companies.
Nevertheless, will they act? The following part analyzes the determinants of the
information acquisition requirements variables.
1.4.3 The informational nudges, financial incentives and the first step
Table 1.5 summarizes the rate of the respondents who want the green-certified lawn
care companies to contact them and give free estimates. It seems the informational nudges
increases the action rate no matter whether there are incentives. However, based on Chisquare tests (Column 3, Table 1.5), the action rate is dependent on the nudge treatment at
10% level when no financial incentives are provided, not in the cases when we give
incentives to the respondents. It suggests that the informational nudges and incentives may
substitute each other when nudging the respondents to act to obtain a green-certified lawn
care contract.
We further use binomial logistic regression (LOGIT) models to identify the
treatment effects, and we show the results in Table 1.6. The odd columns show coefficients
of the regressions and the even columns presents the average marginal effects of the
variables. The experiment design variables are predictors of the probability of actions in
the first model (χ2= 12.93, p = 0.04). The results (Column 1, Table 1.6) show that both
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informational nudges, financial incentives and their interactions increase the log odds of
leaving their contact information for the green-certified lawn care companies. For example,
the informational nudges can increase the log odds of actions by 0.875 at 10% level
(column 1, row 3). The probability of taking the first step increases by 6 percentage points
if the informational nudges are provided (column 2, row 3), which means the nudges have
more than doubled the probability of leaving private contact information. Adding the
financial incentives with the informational nudges, however, does not increase the
probability of leaving private information, which is similar to the findings from the stated
Likert scale variable. Surprisingly, we also find that the respondents from Qualtrics Panel
are less likely to act even they stated that they are more likely to hire a green-certified lawn
care contract (Table 1.4a, row 6).
We add the NEP Scale and the SRA Scale in the second model and find that the
respondents’ probability to take the first step increases when the NEP Scales or the SRA
Scale increases. Financial incentives and their interactions with the informational nudges
still have significant effects in this model, but without financial incentives, the
informational nudges have a limited effect [coefficient =0.778, p = 0.13; average marginal
effect (compared to the baseline) = 0.052, p = 0.09]. It suggests that the informational
nudges can have indirect effects on the action rate through NEP Scales and high SRA
Scales. When we add the interaction terms between treatments and NEP/SRA scales in the
third models, we find that the average marginal effects increase in the third model by half
point percent, and the trend holds when we add more lawn care characteristics and
individual characteristics to the regression in the fourth model.
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We further look into the indirect marginal effects of the informational nudges and
the financial incentives by comparing the predicted marginal effects at specific NEP Scale
and SRA Scale values. We find that the indirect effect of the financial incentives increases
substantially when the NEP Scale is high (Figure 1.1). It may suggest that financial
incentives can motivate homeowners with pro-environmental attitudes. We find no
statistically significant indirect effect of the informational nudges coming through the NEP
and SRA Scales. Worth to mention, we cannot differentiate the effect of presenting Nudge
1 and Nudge 2 together on the action from the effect of showing Nudge 1 alone.
The results clearly demonstrate that both information and financial incentives
increase the chance of people leaving their contact information for the lawn care
companies. However, the results suggest that they are substitutes when implemented
together. Evidence also shows that the financial incentives may nudge people with high
NEP Scales to act and the size of the financial incentives matters. This result seems to
support the argument by Gneezy et al. [2011] that the high financial incentive may have a
large price effect so that it can offset the crowd-out effect and increases the action to obtain
green-certified lawn care contracts.
1.5 Conclusion
This study empirically investigates the impact of the informational nudges on
promoting voluntary behavior to adopt BMPs indirectly to reduce NPS pollution in a lawn
care market setting. The green certification program by RIDEM integrates BMPs, a list of
environmental goods, into the lawn care contracts which are market goods. In collaboration
with the local lawn care industry in Rhode Island, we conduct a field experiment and obtain
two types of outcomes to measure the residents’ demand for the green certification. The
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first type belongs to the stated preferences family. It includes the measure of people’s WTP
for and the reported likelihood to obtain the green-certified lawn care contracts. The second
type is one type of revealed preferences, and it captures whether individuals take the first
step towards a green-certified lawn care contracts by leaving their private contact
information for the lawn care companies.
The analysis of three outcome variables indicates that the information nudges can
induce behavior change conditionally. Specifically, the respondents report WTP premiums
and a higher likelihood to sign contracts when we present them the informational nudges.
The information nudges also induce more respondents to take the first step to contract.
However, when we show the informational nudges and financial incentives together, we
detect that they substitute each other especially when the financial incentives are small.
Our findings also suggest that the effect of the informational nudges differs across different
types of people. The WTP premiums diminish as the spending on the lawn care increase;
the informational nudges have a more significant effect when people have low NEP Scales.
Conversely, financial incentives have a larger effect when people have high NEP Scales.
Additional results show that the financial incentives can nudge pro-social behavior
to some extent, particularly when the incentives are significant. However, when managing
NPS pollution from the lawns, an environmental regulator has to face many small private
landowners. It makes the financial incentives unfeasible under a limited budget. When
incentives substitute the effect of the informational nudges and large financial incentives
are not an option, the voluntary programs to reduce NPS pollution should focus on the
nudging strategies by more efficient education programs and offering more
environmentally friendly choices to the public.

26

Acknowledgments
This material is based upon work supported in part by the RI Agricultural Experiment
Station Hatch Regional – RI0015-W3133 and National Science Foundation EPSCoR
Track-2 Cooperative Agreement IIA-1330406, Collaborative Research: North East Water
Resources Network.

27

References
Ahmed, Rasha, and Kathleen Segerson. 2011. “Collective Voluntary Agreements to
Eliminate Polluting Products.” Resource and Energy Economics 33 (3): 572–88.
doi:10.1016/j.reseneeco.2011.01.002.
Aldrovandi, Silvio, Gordon DA Brown, and Alex M. Wood. 2015. “Social Norms and
Rank-Based Nudging: Changing Willingness to Pay for Healthy Food.” Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Applied 21 (3): 242.
Allcott, Hunt. 2011. “Social Norms and Energy Conservation.” Journal of Public
Economics, Special Issue: The Role of Firms in Tax Systems, 95 (9–10): 1082–
95. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.03.003.
Alpízar, Francisco, and Peter Martinsson. 2012. “Paying the Price of Sweetening Your
Donation: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment.” Economics Letters 114
(2): 182–85. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.008.
Alpízar, Francisco, Till Requate, and Albert Schram. 2004. “Collective versus Random
Fining: An Experimental Study on Controlling Ambient Pollution.”
Environmental and Resource Economics 29 (2): 231–52.
doi:10.1023/B:EARE.0000044608.66145.0c.
Attari, Shahzeen Z., David H. Krantz, and Elke U. Weber. 2016. “Energy Conservation
Goals: What People Adopt, What They Recommend, and Why.” Judgment and
Decision Making 11 (4): 342.
Bakacs, Michele E., Mike Haberland, Salvatore S. Mangiafico, Aileen Winquist,
Christopher C. Obropta, Amy Boyajian, and Sara Mellor. 2013. “Rain Barrels: A
Catalyst for Change?” Journal of Extension 51 (3).
https://www.joe.org/joe/2013june/rb6.php.
Ballentine, Jane.2005. “Chesapeake Bay Social Marking Initiative 2004-2005 Final
Report”, Chesapeake Bay Program
https://cfpub.epa.gov/npstbx/relatedpopup.cfm?RelatedMaterialID=118
Bertrand, Marianne, and Adair Morse. 2011. “Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases,
and Payday Borrowing.” The Journal of Finance 66 (6): 1865–93.
doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01698.x.
Brandon, Duane M., James H. Long, Tina M. Loraas, Jennifer Mueller-Phillips, and
Brian Vansant. 2013. “Online Instrument Delivery and Participant Recruitment
Services: Emerging Opportunities for Behavioral Accounting Research.”
Behavioral Research in Accounting 26 (1):1–23. https://doi.org/10.2308/bria50651.
Costa, Dora L., and Matthew E. Kahn. 2013. “Energy Conservation ‘Nudges’ and
Environmentalist Ideology: Evidence from a Randomized Residential Electricity
Field Experiment.” Journal of the European Economic Association 11 (3): 680–
702. doi:10.1111/jeea.12011.
Craig, Robin Kundis, and Anna M. Roberts. 2015. “When Will Governments Regulate
Nonpoint Source Pollution? A Comparative Perspective.”
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2514350.
Depositario, Dinah Pura T., Jr. Nayga Rodolfo M., Ximing Wu, and Tiffany P. Laude.
2009. “Effects of Information on Consumers’ Willingness to Pay for Golden
Rice.” Asian Economic Journal 23 (4): 457–76. doi:10.1111/j.146728

8381.2009.02021.x.
Dietz, Michael E., John C. Clausen, and Karen K. Filchak. 2004. “Education and
Changes in Residential Nonpoint Source Pollution.” Environmental Management
34 (5): 684–90. doi:10.1007/s00267-003-0238-4.
Dunlap, Riley E., Kent D. Van Liere, Angela G. Mertig, and Robert Emmet Jones. 2000.
“New Trends in Measuring Environmental Attitudes: Measuring Endorsement of
the New Ecological Paradigm: A Revised NEP Scale.” Journal of Social Issues
56 (3): 425–42. doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00176.
Eisenhauer, Brian W., Nicholas Stevenson, Julia Peterson. 2010. "Changing homeowner's
lawn care behavior to reduce nutrient losses in New England's urbanizing
watersheds Social Science Results Summary." University of New Hampshire
Cooperative Extension report.
Eur. Environ. Agency (EEA). 2007. “Europe’s Environment—The Fourth Assessment,
2007. “Copenhagen: EEA
EPA. 2005. “National management measures to control nonpoint source pollution from
forestry.” EPA-841-B-05-001, EPA, Washington, DC
EPA. 2007. “National Water Quality Inventory: Report to Congress.” EPA 841-R-07001, EPA, Washington, DC
Fellner, Gerlinde, Rupert Sausgruber, and Christian Traxler. 2013. “Testing Enforcement
Strategies in the Field: Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information.” Journal of
the European Economic Association 11 (3): 634–60. doi:10.1111/jeea.12013.
Ferraro, Paul J., and Agnes Kiss. 2002. “Direct Payments to Conserve Biodiversity.”
Science 298 (5599): 1718–19. doi:10.1126/science.1078104.
Gneezy, Uri, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel. 2011. “When and Why Incentives
(Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 25
(4): 191–209.
Griffin, Ronald C., and Daniel W. Bromley. 1982. “Agricultural Runoff as a Nonpoint
Externality: A Theoretical Development.” American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 64 (3): 547–52. doi:10.2307/1240648.
Hansen, Pelle Guldborg. 2015. “The Definition of Nudge and Libertarian Paternalism:
Does the Hand Fit the Glove?” European Journal of Risk Regulation, no. 1: 1–20.
Hobbie, Sarah E., Jacques C. Finlay, Benjamin D. Janke, Daniel A. Nidzgorski, Dylan B.
Millet, and Lawrence A. Baker. 2017. “Contrasting Nitrogen and Phosphorus
Budgets in Urban Watersheds and Implications for Managing Urban Water
Pollution.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114 (16): 4177–82.
doi:10.1073/pnas.1618536114.
Jenkins, Virginia. 2015. The Lawn: A History of an American Obsession. Smithsonian
Institution.
Kelly, Meghan, Samuel Little, Kaitlin Phelps, Carrie Roble, and Michaela Zint. 2012.
“Watershed Outreach Professionals’ Behavior Change Practices, Challenges, and
Needs.” Applied Environmental Education & Communication 11 (1): 35–52.
doi:10.1080/1533015X.2012.728066.
Lacetera, Nicola, Mario Macis, and Robert Slonim. 2012. “Will There Be Blood?
Incentives and Displacement Effects in Pro-Social Behavior.” American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4 (1): 186–223. doi:10.1257/pol.4.1.186.
Law, Neely, Lawrence Band, and Morgan Grove. 2004. “Nitrogen Input from Residential
29

Lawn Care Practices in Suburban Watersheds in Baltimore County, MD.” Journal
of Environmental Planning and Management 47 (5): 737–55.
doi:10.1080/0964056042000274452.
Levitt, Steven D., and John A. List. 2007. “What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring
Social Preferences Reveal about the Real World?” The Journal of Economic
Perspectives 21 (2): 153–74.
Mathios, Alan D. 2000. “The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices:
An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market.” The Journal of Law and Economics
43 (2): 651–78. doi:10.1086/467468.
Milesi, C., C. D. Elvidge, J. B. Dietz, B. T. Tuttle, R. R. Nemani, and S. W. Running.
2005. “A Strategy for Mapping and Modeling the Ecological Effects of US
Lawns.” J. Turfgrass Manage 1: 83–97.
Nielson, Lisa, and Courtland L. Smith. 2005. “Influences on Residential Yard Care and
Water Quality: Tualatin Watershed, Oregon.” JAWRA Journal of the American
Water Resources Association 41 (1): 93–106.
Otto, Philipp E., and Friedel Bolle. 2011. “Multiple Facets of Altruism and Their
Influence on Blood Donation.” The Journal of Socio-Economics 40 (5): 558–63.
doi:10.1016/j.socec.2011.04.010.
Pellerano, JoséA., Michael K. Price, Steven L. Puller, and Gonzalo E. Sánchez. 2016.
“Do Extrinsic Incentives Undermine Social Norms? Evidence from a Field
Experiment in Energy Conservation.” Environmental and Resource Economics,
November, 1–16. doi:10.1007/s10640-016-0094-3.
RIDEM. 2014 “303(d) list: List of Impaired Waters.”
http://www.dem.ri.gov/pubs/303d/303d14d.pdf
Rissman, Adena R., and Stephen R. Carpenter. 2015. “Progress on Nonpoint Pollution:
Barriers &amp; Opportunities.” Daedalus 144 (3): 35–47.
doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00340.
Rousseau, Sandra, and Liesbet Vranken. 2011. “The Impact of Information on the
Willingness-to-Pay for Labeled Organic Food Products.”
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1859285.
Rushton, Philippe J., Roland D. Chrisjohn, and G. Cynthia Fekken. 1981. “The Altruistic
Personality and the Self-Report Altruism Scale.” Personality and Individual
Differences 2 (4): 293–302. doi:10.1016/0191-8869(81)90084-2.
Schubert, Christian. 2017. “Green Nudges: Do They Work? Are They Ethical?”
Ecological Economics 132 (February): 329–42.
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.11.009.
Segerson, Kathleen. 1988. “Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution Control.”
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 15 (1): 87–98.
doi:10.1016/0095-0696(88)90030-7.
———. 2013. “Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Protection and Resource
Management.” Annual Review of Resource Economics 5 (1): 161–80.
doi:10.1146/annurev-resource-091912-151945.
Shortle, James S., Marc Ribaudo, Richard D. Horan, and David Blandford. 2012.
“Reforming Agricultural Nonpoint Pollution Policy in an Increasingly BudgetConstrained Environment.” Environmental Science & Technology 46 (3): 1316–
25. doi:10.1021/es2020499.
30

Spence, PorchèL., Deanna L. Osmond, Wesley Childres, Joshua L. Heitman, and Wayne
P. Robarge. 2012. “Effects of Lawn Maintenance on Nutrient Losses Via
Overland Flow During Natural Rainfall Events1.” JAWRA Journal of the
American Water Resources Association 48 (5): 909–24. doi:10.1111/j.17521688.2012.00658.x.
Stemle, Adam, Hirotsugu Uchida, and Cathy A. Roheim. 2016. “Have Dockside Prices
Improved after MSC Certification? Analysis of Multiple Fisheries.” Fisheries
Research 182 (October): 116–23. doi:10.1016/j.fishres.2015.07.022.
Sun, Bo, Linxiu Zhang, Linzhang Yang, Fusuo Zhang, David Norse, and Zhaoliang Zhu.
2012. “Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution in China: Causes and Mitigation
Measures.” Ambio 41 (4): 370–79. doi:10.1007/s13280-012-0249-6.
Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. 2008. "Nudge: Improving Decisions about
Health, Wealth, and Happiness." Yale University Press.
Xepapadeas, Anastasios. 2011. “The Economics of Non-Point-Source Pollution.” Annual
Review of Resource Economics 3 (1): 355–73. doi:10.1146/annurev-resource083110-115945.

31

Table 1.1: Treatment Table
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General
Treatments

Description

Portion of N

Baseline treatment

No nudges + No incentives

1/12

Treatment group 1

Nudges + No incentives

1/6

Treatment group 2

No nudges + Incentives

1/4

Treatment group 3

Nudges + Incentives

1/2

Subgroup
Baseline
treatment
Subgroup 1
Subgroup 2
Subgroup 1
Subgroup 2
Subgroup 1
Subgroup 2
Subgroup 3
Subgroup 4

Description

Portion of N

No nudges + No incentives

1/12

Nudge1
Nudge1 + Nudge 2
Incentive 1
Incentive 2
Nudge 1 + Incentive 1
Nudge 1 + Incentive 2
Nudge 1 + Nudge 2 + Incentive 1
Nudge 1 + Nudge 2 + Incentive 2

1/12
1/12
1/6
1/12
1/6
1/12
1/6
1/12

Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics
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Variables
Description
Panel A. Main outcome variables
WTP
Willingness to pay ($) for green-certified lawn contracts
Likert Scale
Likert scale to hire one ( 1-6;1= extremely unlikely; 6 = extremely likely)
Act
Request contact from lawn care companies(dummy, 1= request)
Panel B. Experiment design variables
Nudge 1
Informational nudge 1 (dummy, = 1 if provided)
Nudge 1 only
Informational nudge 1 only (dummy, = 1 if provided)
Nudges 1&2
Informational nudges 1 and 2 (dummy, = 1 if provided))
Low incentive
Incentive 1, 25% of contract (dummy, = 1 if provided)
High incentive
Incentive 2, 50% of contract (dummy, = 1 if provided)
Panel
Panel (dummy, = 1 if respondents comes from Panel)
Panel C. Household lawn care characteristics
Hire
Had a lawn contract in 2016 (dummy, = 1 if had one)
Cost in 2016
Lawn care spending in 2016
Acreage
Lawn acreage
# Practices
Number of practices to manage lawns in 2016
# BMPs
Number of known BMPs applied to lawns in 2016
Panel D. Respondents' individual characteristics
NEP Scale
New Ecological Paradigm scale (0-6)
SRA Scale
Self-Report Altruism Scale (0-80)
Belief
Number of BMPs that is recognized as effective by the respondents(0-6)
Gender
Gender (dummy, =1 if female)
Age
Age (categorical variable)
Education
Education (categorical variable)
Income
Income (categorical variable)

N

Median

Mean

Std. Dev

1552
1591
1277

200
3
0

421.5
3.11
0.12

910.75
1.69
0.32

1657
1657
1657
1603
1603
1736

1
0
0
1
0
1

0.67
0.33
0.34
0.5
0.25
0.58

0.47
0.47
0.47
0.5
0.43
0.49

1736
1641
1648
1716
1628

0
140
0.5
4
3

0.15
367.66
0.7
3.87
3.47

0.35
820.72
1.22
2.15
1.58

1534
1512
1616
1545
1567
1569
1492

3.53
39
4
1
4
6
4

3.58
39.36
3.56
0.65
4
5.25
4.4

0.56
12.17
2.05
0.48
1.55
1.62
1.8

Table 1.3: Estimation results of the TOBIT models
(1)
WTP

(2)
WTP

(3)
WTP

(4)
WTP

0.957***
(0.0715)
125.7*
(67.87)
-0.343**
(0.171)
78.75
(52.21)

0.955***
(0.0726)
134.9*
(69.99)
-0.346**
(0.174)
64.39
(58.66)
47.70
(39.84)
0.181
(1.865)

0.845***
(0.0867)
140.5**
(69.87)
-0.347**
(0.161)
63.77
(54.89)
40.58
(41.89)
-0.426
(1.943)

0.848***
(0.0999)
92.03
(61.27)
-0.249
(0.185)
17.58
(47.50)
-62.52
(38.53)
1.706
(1.483)

Other lawn care
characteristics





Other individual
characteristics





VARIABLES
Cost in 2016
Nudge 1
Nudge 1 # Cost in 2016
Panel
NEP Scale
SRA Scale

N
1,544
1,462
1,348
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

34

675

Table 1.4a: Estimation results of the OLOGIT models
VARIABLES
No nudges # Low incentive
No nudges # High incentive
Nudge 1 # No incentive
Nudge 1 # Low incentive
Nudge 1 # High incentive
Panel

(1)
Likelihood

(2)
Likelihood

(3)
Likelihood

(4)
Likelihood

0.296
(0.194)
0.786***
(0.226)
0.525***
(0.196)
0.324*
(0.182)
0.677***
(0.200)
0.464***
(0.0986)

0.335*
(0.199)
0.778***
(0.234)
0.462**
(0.205)
0.345*
(0.189)
0.652***
(0.205)
0.445***
(0.110)
0.773***
(0.0987)
0.0167***
(0.00445)

0.256
(0.197)
0.758***
(0.228)
0.377*
(0.201)
0.297
(0.186)
0.645***
(0.202)
0.403***
(0.110)
0.822***
(0.101)
0.0139***
(0.00454)

0.359*
(0.205)
0.827***
(0.244)
0.397*
(0.210)
0.381**
(0.194)
0.627***
(0.214)
0.452***
(0.127)
0.713***
(0.103)
0.0176***
(0.00469)

NEP Scale
SRA Scale

Lawn care characteristics



Other individual
characteristics
Observations
1,590
1,501
1,436
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1,368

Table 1.4b: Average marginal effect comparison
Extremely
unlikely
1

Moderately
unlikely
2

Slightly
unlikely
3

Slightly
likely
4

Moderately
likely
5

Extremely
likely
6

No nudges # Low incentiveψ

-0.0792*
(0.0409)

-0.00811**
(0.00380)

0.00206
(0.00221)

0.0272*
(0.0146)

0.0377**
(0.0186)

0.0204**
(0.00988)

No nudges # High incentiveψ

-0.173***
(0.0441)

-0.0289***
(0.00848)

-0.00505
(0.00458)

0.0494***
(0.0138)

0.0961***
(0.0245)

0.0617***
(0.0178)

Nudge 1 # No incentiveψ

-0.101**
(0.0411)

-0.0117***
(0.00429)

0.00152
(0.00232)

0.0336**
(0.0144)

0.0495***
(0.0191)

0.0276**
(0.0107)

Nudge 1 # Low incentiveψ

-0.0977**
(0.0388)

-0.0112***
(0.00354)

0.00163
(0.00226)

0.0328**
(0.0139)

0.0479***
(0.0176)

0.0266***
(0.00939)

VARIABLES
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Nudge 1 # High incentiveψ

-0.138***
-0.0196***
-0.000855
0.0432***
0.0723***
0.0430***
(0.0409)
(0.00542)
(0.00285)
(0.0140)
(0.0201)
(0.0122)
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ψ: Baseline category is the treatment without nudges or incentives.

Table 1.5: Action rate by treatments

No Incentives
Low Incentives
High Incentives

No Nudges
4.76%
11.11%
14.00%

Nudges
10.67%
12.13%
16.67%
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Nudges vs. Act (p-value)
χ2 = 3.19, p = 0.07
χ2 = 0.14, p = 0.70
χ2 = 0.36, p = 0.54

Table 1.6: Estimation results of the LOGIT models
(1)
Act

Variables
ψ

No nudges # Low incentive

No nudges # High incentiveψ
Nudge 1 # No incentiveψ
Nudge 1 # Low incentiveψ
Nudge 1 # High incentiveψ
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Panel
NEP Scale
SRA Scale

Coef.
0.924*
(0.509)
1.181**
(0.544)
0.875*
(0.510)
1.009**
(0.486)
1.385***
(0.497)
-0.350**
(0.174)

A.M.E.
0.0642**
(0.0297)
0.0922**
(0.0403)
0.0594**
(0.0293)
0.0728***
(0.0264)
0.118***
(0.0328)
-0.0365**
(0.0181)

(2)
Act

(3)
Act

(4)
Act

Coef.
A.M.E.
Coef.
A.M.E.
Coef.
A.M.E.
0.904*
0.0640**
1.361
0.0732**
0.329
0.0876***
(0.518)
(0.0313)
(2.722)
(0.0310)
(2.823)
(0.0324)
1.120**
0.0870**
-0.101
0.107**
-0.388
0.118***
(0.557)
(0.0411)
(3.020)
(0.0415)
(3.261)
(0.0437)
0.778
0.0521*
3.714
0.0578**
3.192
0.0687**
(0.522)
(0.0304)
(2.965)
(0.0295)
(2.892)
(0.0304)
0.984** 0.0722***
2.711
0.0776***
2.677
0.0865***
(0.494)
(0.0278)
(2.472)
(0.0266)
(2.557)
(0.0277)
1.396*** 0.122***
1.466
0.125***
0.744
0.111***
(0.505)
(0.0341)
(2.734)
(0.0330)
(2.866)
(0.0331)
-0.541*** -0.0556*** -0.576*** -0.0584*** -0.771*** -0.0742***
(0.192)
(0.0198)
(0.193)
(0.0197)
(0.243)
(0.0234)
0.692*** 0.0710*** 1.239** 0.0775*** 0.890** 0.0558***
(0.163)
(0.0167)
(0.484)
(0.0173)
(0.442)
(0.0191)
0.0165** 0.00169** -0.00335 0.00187** -0.00843
0.00107
(0.00726) (0.000747) (0.0192) (0.000766) (0.0233) (0.000854)

Treatments # NEP scale


Treatments # SRA scale


Lawn care characteristics

Other individual characteristics

Observations
1,276
1,200
1,200
1,079
Robust standard errors in parentheses for the coefficient column and delta method standard errors in parentheses for marginal effect
column. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ψ: Baseline category is the treatment without nudges or incentives.
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Predictive Marginal Effects of NEP Scale

0

1

2
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NEP Scale

Baseline
High incentive
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Figure 1.1: Indirect effects of the financial incentives through NEP Scale

39

6

MANUSCRIPT-2
Uncertainty and nonpoint source polluters’ behavior under an ambient tax policy
(To be submitted)
by
Haoran Miao a, Todd Guilfoos a, and Emi Uchida a
a

Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island, Kinston, RI

Abstract
Ambient-based policy instruments are one approach to regulate nonpoint source pollution.
A series of experimental studies have investigated the advantages and disadvantages of the
policy under strategic uncertainty but not environmental uncertainty. This study
implements a laboratory experiment to further explore the ambient tax policy under
strategic uncertainty combined with environmental uncertainty at the individual level. The
ability to observe other polluters’ actions also varies in the experiment. The results indicate
that environmental uncertainty at the individual level does not affect the overall efficiency
of the ambient tax policy, but induces under-abatement. Evidence suggests that the
nonpoint source polluters tend to be risk-seeking under individual-level environmental
uncertainty when given group incentives. Additionally, we find that the ability to observe
other group members’ behavior may cause cooperative behavior even in a non-cooperative
experiment setting.
JEL Classification: C91, Q52, Q53, D01
Keywords: Nonpoint Source Pollution, Environmental Uncertainty, Information
Disclosure, and Laboratory Experiment
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2.1 Introduction
Ambient-based policy instruments proposed by economists [e.g., Segerson, 1988;
Xepapadeas, 1992] have shown promise to reduce nonpoint source (NPS) pollution and to
increase social efficiency through a series of laboratory economic experiments [e.g.,
Spraggon, 2002; Cochard, Willinger, and Xepapadeas, 2005; Suter et. al, 2008]. Ambientbased policy instruments do not require the regulator to measure individual polluter’s
emission level. Therefore, those instruments can theoretically bypass the information
asymmetry problems between the environmental regulator and individual polluters and
solve the group moral hazard and/or adverse selection problems when accurate
observations of individual emissions are not feasible [Xepapadeas, 2011].
Previous studies have tested their effectiveness and efficiency and NPS polluters’
potential behavior in laboratory experiments in various contexts. For example, Spraggon
[2004] examines the ability of lump-sum or proportional fines and bonuses to reduce NPS
pollution with heterogeneous agents. The study discovers that proportional fines and bonus
(ambient tax/subsidy) are sufficient to achieve group pollution targets, but it also observes
inefficiency and inequality when the agents have different capabilities to pollute. Poe et al.
[2004] examine behavioral responses to a few ambient-based policy instruments by
allowing polluters to cooperate. They find that the participants’ behavior deviates
substantially from theoretical predictions of non-cooperative settings. They also find that
the instruments which give a proportional bonus to the groups lower their emission levels
under a pollution target and thus induce over-abatement behavior. The over-compliance
behavior also occurs in other experiments] in which subjects are allowed to communicate
with each other under a set of ambient-based policy instruments. Suter, Vossler, and Poe
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[2009] utilize realistic dairy farm data to model firms with different sizes in their
experiments. They find evidence that shows the heterogeneity of firm sizes generate both
desirable treatment effects and unattractive outcomes under the ambient-based tax
instrument.
These experimental studies of ambient-based policy, however, examine its
behavioral effects only when the participants face strategic uncertainty, that is when the
participants are uncertain about other polluters’ actions. Several experimental studies
introduce stochastic components at the group level, which does not affect individual NPS
polluter’s emission as environmental uncertainty [e.g., Suter et al., 2008, Suter and Vossler,
2013]. As a matter of fact, the effect of environmental uncertainty under the ambient-based
policy, especially its impact on individual behavior, have not been well studied since
Spraggon [2002] reports in his experiment that “the Tax-Subsidy and Tax instruments are
better able to enforce the standard than the Subsidy and Group Fine instruments with
inexperienced subjects under certainty” and “the result is robust to uncertainty”. This study
explores how ambient tax instruments affect NPS polluters’ behavior when environmental
uncertainty exists at the individual level using a large-scale laboratory experiment.
Uncertainty is an essential feature of NPS pollution problem [Young et al., 1989],
and it is one of the reasons that NPS pollution is difficult to regulate. In a seminal study,
Segerson [1988] developed a theoretical model that shows that ambient-based policy
instruments could be used to control NPS pollution in the presence of uncertainty and
obstacles of monitoring. We can consider uncertainty and monitoring difficulties both as
information problems in NPS pollution control. However, almost every economic
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experiment testing ambient-based policy implements monitoring difficulties and strategic
uncertainty but neglects environmental uncertainty, especially at the individual level.
Several studies present environmental uncertainty at the group level in the context
of NPS pollution problems [Suter and Vossler, 2013 and Suter et al., 2008]. Other studies
[e.g., Cason and Gangadharan, 2013] recognize that environmental uncertainty is an
important aspect of NPS pollution problems. However, they do not test the effects of
environmental uncertainty because of the existence of the experiment results of Spraggon
[2002]. In general, almost all experimental studies examining the ambient-based policy
assumes that there are determinate relationships between individual pollution emission
levels and individual polluter’s actions. This study relaxes this assumption and embeds
environmental uncertainty at the individual level to test the effect of environmental
uncertainty under the ambient-based policy.
The first motivation of embedding environmental uncertainty at the individual level
in our experiment is that the action of one NPS polluter is not the only determinate factor
of individual pollution emission levels. Other factors affect the emission levels include
temperature, rainfall, and management parameters [Yong et al., 1989]. The implementation
of best management practices (BMPs), such as cover crops, contour farming, and
conservation tillage, is a standard approach to reducing agricultural NPS pollution. But the
effectiveness of these BMPs are not absolute, and extreme weather events can amplify the
uncertainty in their effectiveness [Woznicki and Nejadhashemi, 2014].
The second motivation to test the treatment effects of environmental uncertainty at
the individual level is to fill the gap of describing decision-making under the ambient-based
policy. Existing economic theories such as expected utility theory [Von Neumann &
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Morgenstern, 1944] and prospect theory [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] describe how
uncertainty or risk affect decision-making in general. Additionally, Faucheux and Froger
[1995] studies decision-making under environmental uncertainty. A series of experiments
testing these theories suggest that decision-making is related to the framing of the
experiments [ e.g., Cohen, Jaffray, and Said, 1987; Elliott, 1998]. In the literature using
experiments to examine the ambient-based policy, two studies test the effects of
environmental uncertainty at the group level [Spraggon, 2002; Miao et al., 2016]. Spraggon
[2002] compares four types ambient-based instruments and find that environmental
uncertainty at the group levels does not have significant effects on the efficiency of a subset
of ambient-based policies. Miao et al. [2016] test the ambient tax/subsidy instrument in a
spatially heterogeneous setting and use uncertain sensor information to model
environmental uncertainty at the group levels. They find that the more frequent monitoring
leads to efficiency gains. However, these two studies model environmental uncertainty at
the group level and their analysis of the effects of environmental uncertainty also focuses
at the group level. This study contributes to the current knowledge of effectiveness and
efficiency of ambient-based policy by adding analysis of the impact of environmental
uncertainty at the individual level on individual behavior.
Another contribution of this study is to test whether NPS polluters’ knowledge of
other polluters’ actions can affect their behavior. Previous studies assume individual NPS
polluter’s actions are hidden not only from the environmental regulator but also from the
group members. Experiment protocols only provide ambient pollution information and
related payoffs to the subject. In Spraggon [2013], the number of other polluters and their
payoff are also unknown to the individuals in some treatments. We investigate a different
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scenario in which NPS polluters’ actions are common knowledge among group members
but still hidden from the environmental regulator. This treatment is important because
individual polluters in the field may be able to observe the practices implemented by their
neighbors. Additionally, studies in the game theory literature suggest that knowing each
other’s actions may affect players’ ability to learn in noise payoff settings. For example,
Bereby-Meyer and Roth [2006] find that the subjects' ability to learn to cooperate in a
repeated prisoner's dilemma game was substantially diminished when the payoffs were
noisy, although players could monitor other players’ lagged actions. This study further
utilizes this treatment to explores whether knowing others’ pollution levels may affect
polluting behavior.
We design a new laboratory experiment to test the effectiveness and efficiency of
ambient-based policy by understanding the connections between individual-level
environmental uncertainty (information disclosure) and NPS polluters’ behavior. In the
experiment, we disclose the information about other group members’ actions to the
participants as if they can observe other group members’ actions. We follow the design in
Suter et al. [2008] but decompose the group uncertainty into individual uncertainty. We
also vary the individual uncertainty into three levels: certainty, the low uncertainty, and
high uncertainty.The objective of the treatments is to gauge the extent to which uncertainty
levels or information disclosure influences social efficiency outcomes and NPS polluters’
behavior. The information disclosure treatment block includes two levels: with and without
information disclosure. When the information is not disclosed, the subjects only have
information on ambient pollution and related payoffs. When the information is disclosed,
subjects are given information on other polluters’ pollution decisions in the same group.
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We find that the environmental uncertainty at the individual level does not affect
the social efficiency. However, environmental uncertainty increased pollution emissions
and variation of polluters’ behavior. Also, we find that information disclosure reduces
social efficiency by increasing collusive behavior.

2.2 Experimental design
2.2.1 Basic design
This experiment designs NPS pollution problem in a way similar to the theoretical
NPS pollution model by Segerson [1988]. We assume I identical farms locate at one small
watershed and their activities affect water quality in a common pool in the watershed. Each
farm, denoted by i, can produce output yi (yi ≥ 0) in each period and Farm i can sell its
output at a price p. The price is assumed to be fixed across all periods. Then p*yi is the
total revenue of Farm i. The operation cost of Farm i is represented by Ci = C (yi, ai), where
ai (ai ≥ 0) is abatement effort, Cyi = ∂ Ci /∂ yi > 0 and Cai = ∂ Ci /∂ ai > 0.
We use ri = r (yi, ai, ε) to denote the emission function of Farm i where ryi = ∂ ri /∂
yi > 0 and rai = ∂ ri /∂ ai < 0 and ε is a vector of stochastic variables such as rainfall. The
function x = x (r1, r2,…, rI ) ≡ x (a, y, ε) stands for the ambient pollution level of the common
pool in the watershed, where a is a vector of abetment efforts of I farms and y is a vector
of production of I farms. We assume the total environmental damages of the common pool
are a function of the ambient pollution level and equal D(x), where D (0) = 0, D’(x) > 0 and
D’’(x) ≥ 0.
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If the manager of Farm i wants to maximize his/her profit, he/she makes production
and abatement decisions based on the following maximization problem if there are no
exogenous interventions:
max
Profit
𝑦𝑖,𝑎𝑖

= 𝑝 ∗ 𝑦𝑖 − 𝐶 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 )

(1).

However, from the social planner’s point of view, the maximization problem
develops to the following expression:
𝐼

max
Profit = −E[𝐷(𝑥)] + ∑[𝑝 ∗ 𝑦𝑖 − 𝐶 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 )]
𝑦𝑖, 𝑎𝑖

(2).

𝑖=1

Apparently, the optimization problems do not have the same solutions. For optimization
problem (1), the manager chooses a zero abatement effort and a production level that makes
Cyi = p, which equalizes the marginal benefits and marginal costs. In contrast, the solutions
of the social planner’s problems are determined by the following two first-order conditions:
{

−E[𝐷′ (𝑥) ∗ 𝑥𝑦𝑖 ] + 𝑝 − 𝐶𝑦𝑖 = 0
−E[𝐷′ (𝑥) ∗ 𝑥𝑎𝑖 ] − 𝐶𝑎𝑖 = 0

(3).

To make the solutions to the problem (1) and the problem (2) identical, we impose
the following tax [Segerson, 1988; Hansen 1998] is on each farm in the small watershed:
𝑇(𝑥) = {

𝑡𝑖 ∗ (𝑥 − 𝑥̅ )
0

if 𝑥 > 𝑥̅
if 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥̅

(4)

where ti is equal to
𝑡𝑖 =

E[𝐷 ′ (𝑥)∗𝑥𝑦𝑖 ]−E[𝐷 ′ (𝑥)∗𝑥𝑎𝑖 ]
E[𝑥𝑦𝑖 ]−E[𝑥𝑎𝑖 ]

(5).

If Farm i’s manager wants to maximize his/her profit when the environmental
regulator imposes the above tax, he/she makes production and abatement decisions based
on the following profit maximization problem:
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max
𝑦𝑖,𝑎𝑖

= 𝑝 ∗ 𝑦𝑖 − 𝐶 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ) − 𝑇(𝑥)

(6).

Theoretically, Farm i’s decisions about the production and abatement effort will be
consistent with the social planner’s optimal solution and meet the requirement to maximize
the social benefit. Under such policy intervention, the environmental regulator’s mission
is to measure accurate ambient pollution level when imposing the tax. Therefore, the
ambient tax instruments theoretically solve the information problems between the
environmental regulator and NPS polluters.
2.2.2 Parameterization and Treatment description
In this experiment, the participants take the role of managers of farms, and six of
them (I = 6) form a group of potential NPS polluters in a small watershed. They have
identical profit function, but their emission functions may be different from treatments
which will be explained later in this section.
We utilize a 3×2 experimental design which presents six treatments in total (Table
1). The first treatment dimension is the environmental uncertainty at the individual level.
We implement three uncertainty levels, which includes certainty, low uncertainty, and high
uncertainty. The second treatment dimension is the information disclosure, which contains
no-information disclosure and information disclosure.
The first treatment dimension is different from the previous literature in that the
environmental uncertainty is realized at the individual level. We use a certainty treatment
block (Treatment A and D), which implies participants can choose their emission levels
perfectly, as the baseline of the first treatment dimension. This treatment block is the same
as the treatments in most previous literature in that no environmental uncertainty exists.
The second treatment block (Treatment B and E) of this dimension is low uncertainty, in
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which participants have individual emission levels with low variation. The third treatment
block (Treatment C and F) of this dimension is high uncertainty, in which participants have
individual emission levels with high variation.
The second treatment dimension varies from the previous literature in that we
include the ability of participants to observe all other group members’ actions. The first
treatment block in this dimension, including Treatment A, B, and C, is identical to most
previous literature: participants’ actions are hidden from not only the environmental
regulator but also their group members. The second treatment block, including Treatment
D, E, and F, discloses the action information of group members to the participants.
The profit, emission, damage and ambient functions and their related parameters
for all treatments are shown in Table 2.2. From the table, we can see that the profit function
is identical across all the treatments and the cost function inside the profit function take the
quadratic form of the production levels and the abetment effects, which agrees with
assumptions of the cost function in the theoretical design.
The emission functions vary based on uncertainty level. In general, it is determined
by participants’ chosen production levels and abetment efforts and one stochastic
environmental variable. The emission functions have a quadratic form of the production
levels and a square root of abatement efforts, which ensure the emission functions are
convex in production levels and abatement efforts. We simplify the stochastic
environmental vector ε into one dimension. The stochastic terms are completely
independent of production levels and abetment efforts and have means of one. In the
certainty treatment, the stochastic term is a constant which equals one. In the low
uncertainty treatments, the stochastic term is a normalized (mean = 1) lognormal
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distribution with a small variation parameter. In the high uncertainty treatments, the
stochastic term has the same mean as in the low uncertainty treatments, but with a relatively
high variation parameter.
The ambient pollution function, damage function, and ambient tax function are
mostly drawn from previous literature. The ambient pollution function is the summation of
individual emissions. The damage function is a linear function of ambient pollution level.
Based on previous theoretical work, a linear function of ambient pollution level in which
marginal tax equals marginal damage can meet the requirement of the optimal tax.
We design parameters of all the functions such that all the functions meet all the
assumptions in the theoretical design (Table 2.2). We let 𝑥̅ , the threshold of ambient tax,
to be zero in our experiment which implies we impose tax on every unit of pollution.
Because Suter et al. [2008] suggest that the tax threshold does not affect the abilities of
groups to achieve the targeted emissions level and theoretical literature also demonstrate
that the threshold of ambient tax is an exogenous variable determined by the regulator
[Segerson, 1988] , we use zero as the threshold to reduce participants’ confusion towards
the ambient tax.
The modeling of the stochastic variables is motivated by the fact that nutrient loss
from farm field is positively correlated with runoff amount. For example, in a series of
high-frequency sensor data drawn from the research results of North East Water Resource
Network [Vaughan et al. 2017], the Nitrate export in a watershed in Burlington, Vermont
in a two-year period is highly correctly with stormwater yield according to an Ordinal Least
Square regression (R2 = 0.7697). Pollutants on the farm filed could have no significant
impact on water quality if there is no sufficient runoff. We assume that the volume of runoff
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is a proportion of the rainfall depth. Based on this assumption, we further presume that
individual emissions are proportional to rainfall depth. We use monthly summer rainfall
data in the past forty years in Burlington area [National Weather Service Forecast Office,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)] to fit a distribution and
lognormal distribution [ε ~ log N (1.25, 0.5)] is a good estimation of the rainfall data. To
test whether the participants respond to increased variation of rainfall due to other
stochastic variables such as climate change, we double the variation parameter of the fitted
lognormal distribution and keep the same mean to form a new lognormal distribution to
mimic rainfall events with high variation.
The basic design of NPS pollution problem in this experiment presumes the farms
choose between two variables, the production level, and abetment efforts. We adopt the
idea from Suter et al. [2008] to simplify the participants’ choices by identifying a discrete
set of production level and abatement effort combinations which together imply a
management option. One management option is a set of production level and abatement
effort maximizing the pre-tax profit subject to a specific (expected) emission levels (Table
3). Based on such transition, the ambient tax instrument looks more transparent to the
participants.
2.2.3 Experiment protocol
We ran the experiment at the Policy Simulation Lab of University of Rhode Island
(URI) during the fall semester of 2016. A total of 252 students participated in 21
experimental sessions. Most of them were URI undergraduate students, and a small portion
of them are graduate students. The majority of the participants did not have previous
experience participating in economic experiments. We randomly assign all the participants
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to 42 groups during the experimental sessions. Each group had six participants. We used
z-Tree [Fischbacher, 2007] to implement the experiment and record all decisions made by
the participants.
The participants gathered in a meeting room before the experiments began. They
picked a piece of paper with a seat number to find out where they would be seated. Then
they had three minutes to read the consent form for the experiment. After everyone finished
reading the consent form, the lead author gave all participants a brief description of the
experiment and explained to them what they could do (e.g., they could use calculators
provided) and what they could not do (e.g., they could not communicate with each other)
during the experiment sessions. After the lead author answered any questions from the
participants and the consent forms were signed, the participants were led into the laboratory
and were seated in front of their designated computers
We gave each participant a copy of the experimental instruction for the first
treatment (see Appendix I) before the experiment, and they have ten minutes to read it.
After everyone finished reading the instructions, the lead author gave an oral presentation
with PowerPoint slides which emphasized the underlying uncertainty in some treatments.
The participants also were given several numerical examples and were explained how their
management choices could affect their profit, the ambient tax, and ambient pollution. The
first author answered any questions they might have after the presentation. To make sure
the participants understood the general instructions, they were required to answer a list of
verifying questions correctly using the computers before they proceeded to make any
choices in the experiment. The software, z-Tree, checked the participants’ answers
automatically and informed the participants which question(s) they did not correctly
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answer. The experiment began after everyone had correct answers. The lead author
explained the answers further if some participants were still confused by any questions.
Each participant received one pair of treatments, and we implemented one pair of
treatments during one session of the experiment. Uncertainty levels were kept the same in
each pair of treatments but the levels of information disclosure varied. We gave new
instructions and a new presentation before the second treatment. Each treatment consisted
of 45 decisions rounds. The participants made one management choice and learned the
level of ambient pollution, the tax that the environmental regulator imposed and their total
profit from the round. We disclose the participants’ choices to all their group members in
treatments with information disclosure. Rounds were independent of each other because
the management choices and ambient pollution did not affect any outcomes in future
rounds.
After two treatments in each session, we had non-binding discussion segments. At
the beginning of the discussion segments, all the participants played ten rounds of the
experiment in which the tax was Pigovian-type, and the tax they received was based on
their pollution levels as if the environmental regulator could monitor their emissions. We
counted the profits in the ten rounds into their real earnings. After playing the ten rounds
of the experiment, they were free to ask any questions and gave any comments about the
experiment. We provided pizza and beverage for the discussion session.
Each session took about one hour and thirty minutes. The software calculated the
final earning based on 100 rounds of the experiment, the show-up fee, and exchange rate.
We paid the participants in cash at the end of the sessions. The average payoff was $22.10
with a standard deviation of $3.80.
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In each round, the participants chose from six management options. Their decisions
directly determined their private payoff, as shown in Table 2.3. However, their emission
levels were determined by their decisions and uncertainty variables. We assumed that the
total emission equals the summation of six individual emissions in one group. The ambient
tax for the participants is determined by the total emission and tax function in Table 2.2.
For instance, if in one round each participant in one group chooses option #2 and each has
an individual emission of 2.5 after the stochastic process, the total emissions will be 15.
Everyone in the group will pay a tax that is equal to 450 experimental dollars. Everyone’s
total earnings in this round will be 800 – 450 = 350 experimental dollars.

2.3 Theoretical predictions and hypotheses
Since the participants are not allowed to communicate with each other during the
experiment, we use non-cooperative game theory to forecast the outcomes. However, we
do not rule out the possibility that the participants may cooperate with each other during
the experiment since the experiments are a set of repeated games (the participants may
figure out that they benefit if everyone cooperates), and information of other players’
actions are provided in half of the rounds. Also, we assume the participants are rational and
risk-neutral when predicting some uncertainty treatments. The predicted outcomes are
presented in Table 2.4.
The predicted outcomes suggest that if the participants choose not to cooperate with
each other, they select management option #3 to maximize their profit in each treatment,
and the (expected) total emissions equal eighteen. Option #3 is a Nash-equilibrium
selection in this case. We also parameterize the experiment such that the Nash-equilibrium
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selections are the social optimum. However, if the participants find a way to cooperate with
each other, they choose management option #1 to maximize their profit. Thus, the expected
total emissions are six in each treatment. According to previous literature, however,
cooperative cases are very rare in a series of experiments investigating the ambient-based
policy, except under cheap talk or communication treatments. Thus, when we outline
hypotheses to test, we assume that the participants in the experiment are noncooperative
with each other.
Based on the experimental design and the assumptions we make, we form three
basic hypotheses related to the impact of the ambient tax policy, uncertainty, and
information disclosure on social efficiency and individual behavior. The hypotheses are in
the form of the null hypotheses, except Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1: The ambient tax policy increases social efficiency.
Hypothesis 1 stems from the fact that that ambient tax is a disincentive for one unit
of total emission increase. One unit of total emissions increase reduces each participant’s
payoff by 30 experimental dollars. Thus we expect ambient tax can increase social
efficiency since the social efficiency is very low if no such a policy is implemented in the
experiments that many researchers conducted in previous literature.
Hypothesis 2: Uncertainty levels and information disclosure do not affect the total
emissions and the efficiency of the ambient tax policy.
This hypothesis emphasizes possible differences at the group level. We
parameterize the uncertainty treatments such that the expected emission levels equal the
emission levels under certainty treatments. Based on the risk-neutral and rational
assumptions and compliance results at the group level from previous literature, we
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hypothesize that the total emissions do not change due to uncertainty treatments and the
efficiency does not change either. Also, we assume Nash equilibrium behavior dominates
other strategies even though information disclosure can induce behavior change under
some game theory literature.
Hypothesis 3: Uncertainty levels and information disclosure do not induce
behavior differences under the ambient tax policy.
Hypothesis 3 tests potential behavior differences at the individual level. Similar to
the reasons for Hypothesis 2, we do not expect that behavior differences are statistically
significant when presenting uncertainty and information about other players’ actions.

2.4 Results
We highlight three key results from the experiment in this section, organized by the
three hypotheses.
Result 1: The ambient tax policy increases the social efficiency.
We calculate the social efficiency from the view of the social planner. When there
is no policy implemented in the experiment, we assume that there is no social efficiency at
according to the results of many previous experiments and every participant select the
management option #6 as the status quo choice. We follow Spraggon [2002] to define
social efficiency as “the change in the value of net social benefits as a percentage of the
optimal change in social benefits from the status quo,” and the mathematic expression is:
SE = (NSBactual – NSBstatus quo)/ (NSBoptimal – NSBstatus quo)

(7)

where SE is the social efficiency, NSBactual represents the actual net social benefit in each
treatment and round, NSBstatus quo is the net social benefit when the participants made
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choices under the condition that no policy is implemented (in our experiment, we assume
this status quo choice is management option #6 with the emission level 6), and NSB optimal
represents the net social benefit with socially optimal behavior (Every participant choose
management option #3 in our experiment).
The first result comes from a simple inspection of the mean social efficiency of
each treatment with the ambient based tax shown in Table 2.5 (Column 1). The average
social efficiencies of all six treatments are between 63% and 69%. Though there is no direct
comparison group in our experiment, previous experiments, such as Suter et al. [2008] and
Miao et al. [2016], the social efficiency is nearly 0% under no policy scenario. Efficiency
levels of all the treatments are statistically different from 0%.
Result 2a: Under the ambient tax policy, environmental uncertainty at the
individual level increases total emissions; information disclosure decreases total emissions
in certainty treatments.
We can observe the impact of the individual uncertainty and information disclosure
on emissions in the first column in Table 2.5. Average total emissions of Treatments A and
D (certainty treatments) is lower than the predicted emission. In contrast, average total
(expected) emissions of Treatment B, C, E and F (uncertainty treatments) is higher than
the predicted emissions. However, the effect of information disclosure is not systematic.
When there is no environmental uncertainty, information disclosure decreases total
emissions, but the effect does not hold when the payoff is noisy.
We use a panel data approach with a random effect to formally test the effect of
individual uncertainty and information disclosure. We specify the econometric model as
𝑥𝑔𝑡 = ∑FT=A βT T𝑔𝑡 + 𝑣𝑔 + 𝜀𝑔𝑡
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(8)

where 𝑥𝑔𝑡 is the total emission of group g in round t, T𝑔𝑡 are the treatment dummies, βT
are the coefficients of each treatment, 𝑣𝑔 is the group specific error term and 𝜀𝑔𝑡 is the
standard error over group and period.
Based on a post regression analysis, all the total emissions are different from eighteen
which is the predicted pollution level and the social optimum. However, systematic
differences exist between uncertainty and certainty treatments. The average total emissions
of certainty treatments are statistically significantly below the social optimum. It seems a
portion of people tried to cooperate with their group member to reduce their tax burden
during the experiment by choosing management option #1 and #2. The average expected
total emissions of uncertainty treatments are statistically significantly above the social
optimum. We can see that the participants in uncertainty chose management options which
induced expected emissions levels greater than three more often than the participants in
certainty treatments. Thus the uncertainty treatments systematically induce higher emission
levels than certainty treatment. Worth to mention, increasing the level of uncertainty does
not change the overall emissions statistically significantly.
We cannot find systematic differences between treatments with or without perfect
information of other group members’ past actions by eyeball-testing of the mean total
emissions of all treatments (Table 2.5, column 1). However, from the above econometric
model, we find that information disclosure induces statistically significant low emissions
in certainty treatments, but not in uncertainty treatments. In another word, in an
environment without uncertainty, the participants tend to be more cooperative when they
can observe other group members’ past actions. However, when the environment is
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uncertain, or the payoffs are noisy, information disclosure does not increase cooperative
behavior.
Taken together, the environmental uncertainty at the individual level increases total
emissions, compared with the treatments without environmental uncertainty. The ability to
observe other group members’ past actions have a great impact on the total emissions when
no environmental uncertainty exists.
Result 2b: Under the ambient tax policy, environmental uncertainty at the
individual level does not affect the overall social efficiency, however, increasing the level
of uncertainty statistically significantly reduces the allocative efficiency; Information
disclosure reduces overall social efficiency.
In this part, we test the impact of uncertainty and information disclosure on social
efficiency (SE) together with its decompositions: allocative efficiency (AE) and emission
efficiency (EE). The decomposition follows Suter et al. [2008] and the product of AE and
EE equals the SE. A low AE indicates that there is an imperfect allocation of individual
emissions. A low EE means the aggregate emissions deviate far from the optimal level. AE
is equal to100% if individual emissions are perfectly allocated. In the setting of this
experiment, AE is 100% if all group members’ choices are symmetric. EE is equal to 100%
if overall emissions are equal to eighteen.
We specify the following random effect models to test the effect of uncertainty and
information disclosure:
U
SE𝑔𝑡 (AE𝑔𝑡 , EE𝑔𝑡 ) = α + ∑3U=1(γU ∗ Uncertainty𝑔𝑡
) + ∑2Info=1(θInfo ∗
Info
U
Info
Information𝑔𝑡
) + ∑3𝑈=1 ∑2Info=1(ψU−Info ∗ Uncertainty𝑔𝑡
∗ Information𝑔𝑡
) + 𝑣𝑔 +

𝜀𝑔𝑡
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(9)

where SEg𝑡 ((AE𝑔𝑡 , EE𝑔𝑡 ) is the social efficiency (the allocative efficiency, the emission
U
efficiency) of group g in round t, Uncertainty𝑔𝑡
are the uncertainty dummies of group g in

round t (1 represents certainty, 2 represents low uncertainty and 3 represents high
Info
uncertainty) Information𝑔𝑡
are the information dummies of group g in round t (1

represents no information, and 2 represents with information), γU , θInfo , and ψU−Info are
the coefficients of each dummy variable, 𝑣𝑔 is the group specific error term and 𝜀𝑔𝑡 is the
standard error over group and period.
We show the results of the above models in Table 2.6. As expected, the first column
indicates that the environmental uncertainty at the individual level does not affect the
overall social efficiency. However, uncertainty, especially high uncertainty, reduces the
allocative efficiency, which means uncertainty encourage heterogeneous behavior among
the experiment participants. The impact of information disclosure on the efficiency is
different from the predicted results according to Table 2.6. The information disclosure
treatment has an overall negative effect on the social efficiency, and the major source of
efficiency reduction comes from the reduction of the emission efficiency. The information
disclosure increases the allocative efficiency by inducing more symmetric behavior.
However, it seems the total emissions deviate more from the optimal level when the
participants can observe other group members’ actions.
Interestingly, we find that environmental shocks, a negative payoff in round t,
increase emissions in round t +1, using a similar regression model in which the total
emission is the dependent variable and environmental shock is an added independent
variable. In the nonbinding communication with the participants, a large portion of them
indicated that they expected the shocks would not come back so that they increased their
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pollution level in the next round. Although we emphasized that rounds were independent
with each other during the experiment, the participants in uncertainty treatments acted as a
gamblers’ in a game and had wrong beliefs such as gambler’s fallacy.
Result 3: Under the ambient tax policy, environmental uncertainty at the individual
level decreases over-abatement behavior and increases under-abatement behavior;
information disclosure rises over-abatement behavior.
Result 1 reveals that uncertainty and information disclosure may affect the total
emissions. This result looks into the possible behavior differences from individual choices.
Since only six management choices are available to choose from by the experiment
participants and management choices, from #1 to #6, induces increasing (expected)
emissions, we treat the variable (individual decisions) as ordered discrete choices. We
model the individual decisions with a random-effects ordered logistic model, using
uncertainty dummy variables, information disclosure dummy variables and their
interaction terms as the explanatory variables.
The marginal effects of uncertainty and information disclosure treatments on
individual choices are presented in Table 2.7. The estimation results (Row 1 and 2, Table
2.7) suggest that environmental uncertainty at the individual level, no matter it is at the low
or high uncertainty level, statistically significantly reduces the over-abetment choices
(management option #1 and #2) and increases the under-abatement choices (management
option #4, #5 and #6). It seems the participants’ choices are transferred from one type of
sub-optimal choices to the other type of sub-optimal choices when uncertainty treatments
are imposed in the experiment. We did not find systematic choices differences between
two uncertainty levels.
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Also, we find that information disclosure increases the possibilities of overabatement choices (management option #1 and #2). However, information disclosure does
not affect the Nash-equilibrium and under-abatement selections (Table 2.7, row 3). Taken
together, when no environmental uncertainty exists, and the participants can observe other
group members choices, the participants are more likely to choose to over abate which
indicates that they try to cooperate with each other even their choices are not the Nashequilibrium selection.
We further compare the individual choices during the experiment with the choices
in the post-experiment discussion in which the participants face a Pigovian-type tax. We
find that under-abatement choices significantly decrease in the uncertainty treatments.
Based on the discussion with the participants, the seemingly risk-seeking behavior in the
uncertainty treatment may come from the effect of uncertainty and also the feature of the
group incentive (ambient tax policy).
2.5 Conclusion
In this study, we use an NPS water pollution economic experiment to investigate
the impact of environmental uncertainty at the individual level on social efficiency and
NPS polluters’ behavior under the ambient tax policy. This type of environmental
uncertainty imposes an uncertain relationship between individual pollution emission and
individual action. The results of our experiment show that the environmental uncertainty
induces different patterns of NPS polluters’ behavior. Specifically, the environmental
uncertainty largely decreases the possibility of collaboration among NPS polluters in noncooperative settings and increases total emission levels. As the uncertainty level increases,
NPS polluters’ management options vary. Compared with the behavior in an individual tax
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setting, NPS polluters are more risk-seeking under the ambient tax policy. We do not find
the environmental uncertainty has a significant impact on social efficiency, however.
We allow the participants to have the information about the actions of their group
member in half of our treatments in the experiment. We find that the information disclosure
treatment induces a lower social efficiency, compared with no-information disclosure
groups. The loss of social efficiency mostly comes from the trend of collusive behavior.
The trend is triggered by simply observing other group members’ action, even without any
communication.
The results offer the environmental regulators some insight into the possible
implementation of ambient-based policies to regulate NPS pollution. To increase the
efficiency of such kind of policies, they should be aware of potential collusive behavior
which is a threat to the social efficiency. Also, environmental uncertainty can induce NPS
polluters to deviate from the target outcomes of related ambient-based policies. Eliminating
or reducing the influence of the environmental uncertainty on payoff structures is one boost
to the utilization of the ambient-based policies.
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Table 2.1: Treatment conditions
Treatment
A
B
C

Label
No information,
Certainty
No information, Low
uncertainty
No information, High
certainty
Information, Certainty

D
E
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F

Information, Low
uncertainty
Information, High
certainty

Information about other group members' decisions

Uncertainty Level

No

Certainty

No

Low uncertainty

No

High uncertainty

Yes

Certainty

Yes

Low uncertainty

Yes

High uncertainty

Table 2.2: Function forms and parameter values
Parameter Values
Certainty
p = 6.00, A =0.02, B =
0.05, C = 350

Parameter Values
Low uncertainty
p = 6, A =0.02, B =
0.05, C = 350

Parameter Values
High uncertainty
p = 6, A =0.02, B = 0.05,
C = 350

E = 1/3750, F = 4/75, ε
=μ + σ2/2

E = 1/2750, F = 2/275, , ε
~ log N(1.25,0.5)

E = 1/2750, F = 2/275, ε
~ log N(0.875,1)

r

I=6

I=6

I=6

H*x

H = 30

H = 30

H = 30

t*x

t = 30

t = 30

t = 30

Description

Function Form

Profit function
π (yi, ai)

p*yi - (Ayi2 + B ai2) + C

Emission Function
ri(yi, ai, ε)

(Eyi2 - Fai0.5)* ε /(μ + σ2/2)

Ambient pollution
function x(r)
Damage function
D(x)
Tax function
T(x)

I

i 1

i
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Table 2.3: Profit-maximizing values of production and abatement for (expected) emission levels

Management Option
#6
#5
#4
#3
#2
#1

(Expected) Emissions (r)
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00

Abatement (a)
0.00
1.46
2.62
3.93
5.69
8.67

Production (y)
150.00
137.81
123.78
107.91
89.32
65.87

Profit (π)
800.00
796.92
785.92
763.81
724.73
654.68
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Table 2.4: Predicted outcomes of group emissions
Treatment

Label
No information, Certainty

A
B
C

No information, Low
uncertainty
No information, High
certainty
Information, Certainty

D
E
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F

Information, Low
uncertainty
Information, High
certainty

Predicted (expected) total emissions Predicted (expected) total emissions
Under non-cooperative game theory
Under cooperative game theory
18.00

6.00

18.00

6.00

18.00

6.00

18.00

6.00

18.00

6.00

18.00

6.00

Table 2.5: Average expected efficiency of treatments
Expected
Expected
Total
Social
Treatment
Label
Emission Efficiency
A
No information,
16.82
68.34%
certainty
(3.88)
(0.16)

Expected
Emission
Efficiency
89.65%
(0.11)

Expected
Allocative
Efficiency
76.60%
(0.16)

B

No information,
Low uncertainty

19.03
(3.30)

68.99%
(0.16)

92.56%
(0.07)

74.51%
(0.16)

C

High uncertainty

18.59
(3.30)

62.97%
(0.16)

92.57%
(0.07)

68.09%
(0.17)

D

Information,
Certainty

15.97
(4.17)

66.83%
(0.18)

86.20%
(0.16)

78.40%
(0.17)

E

Information,
Low uncertainty

18.93
(4.27)

66.68%
(0.18)

89.71%
(0.11)

74.45%
(0.18)

F

Information,
High uncertainty

19.02
(3.67)

63.99%
(0.15)

91.58%
(0.09)

69.99%
(0.18)

Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses (for example, s.d. = 0.16 means standard of efficiency is 16%)
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Table 2.6: Effects of uncertainty level and information on efficiency
VARIABLES

Low uncertainty
High uncertainty
Information
Low uncertainty #Information
High uncertainty # Information

(1)
Expected
Social
Efficiency
0.007
(0.039)
-0.054
(0.039)
-0.015**
(0.008)
-0.008
(0.011)
0.025**
(0.011)

(2)
Expected
Allocative
Efficiency
-0.021
(0.035)
-0.085**
(0.035)
0.018**
(0.008)
-0.019*
(0.011)
0.001
(0.011)

Observations
3,780
3,780
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(3)
Expected
Emission
Efficiency
0.030
(0.020)
0.029
(0.020)
-0.035***
(0.006)
0.006
(0.008)
0.025***
(0.008)
3,780

Table 2.7: Marginal effects of uncertainty and information disclosure based on the random-effects ordered logistic model
Management
Option
#1

Management
Option
#2

Management
Option
#3

Management
Option
#4

Management
Option
#5

Management
Option
#6

Low uncertainty

-0.0681***
(0.024)

-0.127***
(0.040)

0.052**
(0.022)

0.076***
(0.025)

0.037***
(0.012)

0.031***
(0.011)

High uncertainty

-0.057***
(0.025)

-0.0289**
(0.00848)

0.049**
(0.022)

0.058**
(0.024)

0.027**
(0.012)

0.021**
(0.009)

0.007***
0.007*
-0.008***
0.004
(0.002)
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.003)
N = 22,680; Delta-method standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.011)

VARIABLES

Information
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Abstract
In studies using laboratory experiments to investigate the ambient-based policies, the
participants adapt their strategy after many rounds of interaction in some circumstances.
We conduct a laboratory economic experiment to test how nonpoint source polluters’
behavior evolves under different scenarios. We apply the experiment data to the experience
weighted learning model and find that the participants are mainly reinforced to adapt their
behavior, and their learning processes vary according to different levels of environmental
uncertainty. Specifically, the ability to play a strategy corresponding to the most attractive
payoffs in previous rounds diminishes as the uncertainty level increases. Information
disclosure neutralizes this effect. We then develop an agent-based model to scale up the
findings from the experiment. We calibrate the agents’ learning abilities with the
parameters estimated from the experience weighted learning model learning model. From
the simulation results, we find that environmental shocks decrease emission level in the
ABM after many rounds of interactions given that we disclose group members’ actions,
but we do not observe this effect in the laboratory experiments.
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3.1 Introduction
In the past two decades, researchers have frequently used controlled laboratory
experiments to test the efficiency and effectiveness of those proposed policies to reduce
NPS pollution. For instance, Cason et al. [2003] conducted a laboratory experiment of a
sealed-offer auction to seek voluntary contribution to control NPS pollution and found that
revealing the high environmental benefits to the potential sellers induced misrepresentative
offers. The experimental results suggested that concealing the information of ecological
benefits may improve the policy efficiency. Taylor et al. [2004] used a similar experimental
auction method to study nonpoint source polluters’ voluntary emission-reduction behavior
under a group contract. They found that the group contract could be efficient and effective
to control NPS pollution, but with limitations. The ambient-based policies proposed by
Segerson [1988] represented another promising type of policies and a series of laboratory
experiments were conducted to measure their advantages and disadvantages. Spraggon
[2002] tested the effectiveness of different ambient-based policies and found that the
ambient tax and the combination of ambient subsidy and tax may work better than others.
Cochard, Willinger, and Xepapadeas [2005] had slightly different results in their laboratory
experiments, compared to Spraggon [2002]. Economists also investigated the effects of
heterogeneous NPS polluters [e.g., Spraggon, 2004; Suter, Vossler, and Poe, 2009],
communication [e.g., Vossler et al., 2006], and threshold differences [Suter et al., 2008]
under ambient-based policies using laboratory experiments.
Despite the growing issue on this topic, it is not well understood how players adapt or
evolve toward any equilibrium. In experimental studies, researchers typically model NPS
pollution problems as finite repeated normal-form games with multiple players and assume
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that players’ behavior stabilizes in a short period. They use non-cooperative or cooperative
game theory to predict players’ behavior in each independent round. In most of the
experimental designs, Nash equilibria are socially desired abatement strategies, and the
empirical analyses focus on the average treatment effects of ambient-based policies across
all rounds under different scenarios. Moreover, a few previous studies find that the players
in the repeated games with NPS pollution settings may not form beliefs which are best
strategies for them and stabilize their behavior in the short term. For example, Spraggon
[2002] shows that players’ still change their emission levels after more than twenty rounds,
even in the promising ambient tax/subsidy and tax instruments. Suter, Vossler, and Poe
[2009] demonstrate that total emission levels gradually converge to social optimum in
about twenty rounds. Moreover, Miao et al. [2016] use a laboratory economic experiment
in a setting with realistic in-stream nutrient transport dynamics to test the effectiveness of
the ambient tax/subsidy policies. They show that the observed social efficiency increase
over time in treatments with more frequent information on pollution over time. Also, Miao
et al. [2017] observe unstable social efficiency after forty rounds of the experiment in all
the treatments. The behavior does not converge to the Nash equilibrium despite long-term
interactions. All the evidence suggests that players in the game with NPS pollution settings
adapt their strategies over time instead of reasoning their ways, forming their beliefs or
finding their best strategy in a short period. This study aims to fill these literature gaps by
understanding how players learn to adapt or evolve toward any equilibrium in the repeated
non-cooperative game with NPS pollution settings.
Our study also aims to test whether or not adding environmental uncertainty to the
games with ambient-based policies decreases players’ learning ability. Learning patterns
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in games with strategic uncertainty is different from the patterns in individual-decision
making because the games in which each player gains experience contains other players
who adapt their behavior as they learn experience [Erev and Roth, 1998]. The strategic
uncertainty, which means one individual does not have knowledge about other players’
action, is not the only type of uncertainty in the NPS pollution problems. Environmental
uncertainty, which is independent of players’ actions, represents one important feature of
NPS pollution. It could come from a variation in temperature, rainfall, or other stochastic
processes [Yong et al., 1998] in the NPS water pollution problems. The second motivation
for the study is that we do not understand learning patterns well in the NPS pollution
settings under ambient-based policies, especially when the settings combine strategic
uncertainty and environmental uncertainty. Bereby-Meyer and Roth [2006] show that
noisy payoff decreases players’ ability to learn to cooperate in the repeated prisoner’s
dilemma. Similar to this study,
One important design in most experiments studying ambient-based policies is that
individual player only knows the ambient pollution level and its payoffs after one round
and other players’ actions and their payoffs are hidden from the individual. Such design
assumes that NPS polluters cannot observe other group members’ actions. We vary this
assumption as a dimension of treatments to mimic an extreme scenario in the field that
nonpoint source polluters’ actions are hidden from the environmental regulator but
perfectly observed by group members. As a few studies on public goods games [e.g., Dong,
Zhang, and Tao, 2016] point out that the dynamics of one player’ behavior can be explained
partly by other group members’ behavior, we hypothesize that knowing other players’
action after one round of game can change players’ learning patterns.
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Based on these motivations, we conduct a laboratory experiment with
implementation of an ambient tax policy and a repeated non-cooperative game to achieve
the goals that we mentioned above. We adopt the classic NPS source pollution setting from
[Segerson, 1988] and vary the environmental uncertainty at the individual level, including
certainty, low uncertainty, and high uncertainty. Also, we disclose group members’ actions
to one-half of the sessions of the experiments. Furthermore, we use the most extended
interaction rounds (45 rounds) among the studies investigating the policies to reduce NPS
pollution to check the learning behavior over a long time horizon.
The core research question in this study is whether subjects form beliefs over time
or their decisions are reinforced by previous payoffs under uncertainty. To test this
question, we utilize the experience weighted attraction (EWA) learning model [Camerer,
and Ho, 1999]. EWA is an appealing model for this study to discover how the subjects
adapt their strategies with an ambient-based policy because it integrates belief-based
models and reinforcement learning. We then use post-estimation techniques to compare
learning patterns across diffident environmental uncertainty levels and information set.
As the final analysis, we take the parameters from the learning model to calibrate
an agent-based model (ABM) to scale up and complement the findings from the laboratory
experiments. The application of an ABM is motivated by fundamental limitations of
laboratory experiments that experimenters are typically limited in the numbers of subjects
that can be recruited and the interaction rounds. One may question that different behavior
patterns may appear if we implement the experiment at a large scale and for an extended
time horizon. Duffy [2006] argues that agent-based models (ABMs) are good complements
of human subjects experiment and cheap computer power of ABMs can overcome the
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experimenters’ limitations. Agents in the ABMs are analogous to the subjects in the
laboratory experiments. They are autonomous, and they may have memory and learning
abilities. They can interact with the other agents and environment that the experimenters
build up in the model. We then calibrate an ABM with agents calibrated by parameters
estimated from the EWA learning model to scale up findings from the laboratory
experiment. We ensure that the agents are autonomous and heterogeneous and they can
learn to adapt their strategies. In a nutshell, one agent in the ABM mimics one subject in
the experiment. After building up the ABM, we first compare the simulation results with
the experimental data to ensure the credibility of the ABM. We then increase the number
of agents in the ABM and the number of interaction periods. We also test the sensitivity of
the ambient tax policy when varying the number of players in one group.
From the estimation results of the learning model, we find that players usually do
not form beliefs in the game with an NPS pollution setting which means most players do
not have beliefs about what other players will do. They, in general, use reinforcement
learning to adapt their strategies. That is, they do not care about the hypothetical payoffs
of unchosen strategies. The players’ abilities to map attractions into choice probabilities
decreases as the environmental uncertainty level increases. Providing lagged information
about other players’ behavior significantly increases the abilities to map attractions into
choice probabilities in the low and high environmental uncertainty treatments. Based on
the simulation results of the ABM, different behavior pattern may show up under certain
circumstances when we scale up the number of NPS polluters and interaction times. We
suggest that the agent-based modeling techniques can be used to double check the answers
we have from the laboratory experiments.
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In the next section, we present the details of the experiment. In Section 3.3 we
report the results from the learning model, while in Section 3.4 we state the simulation
results of the ABM. Section 3.5 provides a summary and a discussion of some extensions
of this study.

3.2 Experimental design, Parameterization, and Protocol
The experiment we use to explore the players’ learning process in the NPS pollution
settings under ambient-based policies in this manuscript is identical to the one we conduct
in Miao et al. [2017]. However, because we are particularly interested the learning
behavior, and there is potential spill-over effect in the second part of the sessions of the
experiment, we only use the experimental data we collect from the first part of each session.
Thus, different from Miao et al. [2017], this manuscript here utilizes a pure betweensubjects experimental design.
3.2.1 Basic design
The basic design of the experiment is from the setting of Segerson [1988]. We
denote each farm in a small watershed by i, and there are I identical farms in total. Farm i
can produce output yi (yi ≥ 0) and sell it at a fixed price p. Ci = C (yi, ai) represents the cost
of Farm i, where ai (ai ≥ 0) is abatement effort, Cyi = ∂ Ci /∂ yi > 0 and Cai = ∂ Ci /∂ ai > 0.
ri = r (yi, ai, ε) denotes the emission function of Farm i where ryi = ∂ ri /∂ yi > 0 and rai = ∂
ri /∂ ai < 0 and ε is a vector of stochastic variables such as whether. The function x = x (r1,
r2,…, rI ) ≡ x (a, y, ε) represents the ambient pollution level of the common pool in the
watershed. In the above function, a is a vector of abetment efforts of I farms and y is a
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vector of production of I farms. The total environmental damages of a common pool in the
watershed are a function of the ambient pollution level and equal D(x), where D (0) = 0,
D’(x) > 0 and D’’(x) ≥ 0.
We impost the following ambient tax on each farm in the small watershed to make
sure all the farms abate the pollution at the rate of socially optimal level:
𝑇(𝑥) = {

𝑡𝑖 ∗ (𝑥 − 𝑥̅ )
0

if 𝑥 > 𝑥̅
if 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥̅

(1)

where ti is equal to
𝑡𝑖 =

E[𝐷 ′ (𝑥)∗𝑥𝑦𝑖 ]−E[𝐷 ′ (𝑥)∗𝑥𝑎𝑖 ]
E[𝑥𝑦𝑖 ]−E[𝑥𝑎𝑖 ]

(2).

Readers can find more details about the experimental design in Miao et al. [2017].
3.2.2 Parameterization and experimental protocol
As mentioned in the introduction, we utilize a 3×2 experimental design which
generates six treatments in total (Table 3.1). We implement three uncertainty levels, which
includes certainty, low uncertainty, and high uncertainty. The second treatment dimension
contains no-information disclosure and information disclosure.
The first treatment dimension is essentially different in the parameterization of the
stochastic vector, ε, in the basic design. For simplification, we assume the vector is one
dimension. In the certainty treatment, the stochastic term is equal to one. In the low
uncertainty treatments, the stochastic term is a normalized (mean = 1) lognormal
distribution with a small variation parameter. In the high uncertainty treatments, the mean
the stochastic term is still equal to one, but with a relatively high variation parameter. The
second treatment dimension is different in the ability to observe group members’ actions.
When players are in no-information disclosure treatments, they receive information about
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the ambient pollution level and their payoffs. When players are in information disclosure
treatments, they receive additional information about other players’ actions.
In Table 3.2, we present the ambient pollution function, damage function, and the
ambient tax function which are mostly drawn from previous literature. The threshold of
ambient tax equals zero in our experiment which means we impose a tax on every unit of
pollution. In the basic design, the participants of the experiment need to make two choices,
the abatement level, and the production level. We use the idea from Suter et al. [2008] to
simplify the participants’ choices as a management option. In Table 3.3, one management
option maximizes the pre-tax profit subject to a specific (expected) emission levels.
Forty-two groups participated in twenty-one experimental sessions. Most of them
were URI undergraduate students. Each group had six participants. We used z-Tree
[Fischbacher, 2007] to run the experiment and document all decisions made by the
participants. All sessions of experiments were run at the Policy Simulation Lab of the
University of Rhode Island. A copy of the experimental instruction for the first treatment
(see Appendix IV) was given to the participants before the experiment. They had ten
minutes to read it. After everyone finished reading the instruction, the lead author gave an
oral presentation and explained the underlying uncertainty in some treatments, several
numerical examples, and how their management choices affected their profit, the ambient
tax, and ambient pollution. Each session took about one hour and thirty minutes. The
average payoff was $22.1 with a standard deviation of $3.8.
Each treatment contains forty-five rounds. In each round, the participants chose one
of six management options. Their decisions determined their private payoff which was
shown in Table 3.3. Their emission levels were determined by their decisions and the
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stochastic variables. The total emission equals the summation of six individual emissions
in one group. The total emission and tax function in Table 3.2 form the ambient tax. More
details about the Parameterization and the experimental protocol can be found in Miao et
al. [2017].

3.3 The learning model and results of econometric analysis
We use an econometric model of learning to investigate how players adapt their
strategy in NPS pollution problem settings under ambient-based policies and how the
adaption is different among different environmental uncertainty levels and different
information sets. The experience weighted attraction (EWA) learning model develop by
Camerer, and Ho [1999] are well suited for the analysis of learning process of players in
repeated economic experiments. It combines reinforcement learning models and beliefbased models as a single learning model. This section describes the EWA model and
presents the estimation results which offer insights about how learning differs in different
treatments.
3.3.1 The learning model
Based on the design and parameterization in Section two, we use the following
notation to describe the EWA model suited for our experimental data. Each player i has m
pure strategies (m = 6 and Strategies are choices of management options in our
𝑗

experimental setting). Let 𝑠𝑖 denote that plaer i play the strategy j, one among m strategies.
Since we expand the basic design of NPS polluter problem into repeated games, we use t
to denote one period in the game. Let 𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) be the strategy of player i in period t. At time t,
we cluster the other players’ strategies, the environmental uncertainty level together and
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denoted them as 𝑧(𝑡). If player i chooses strategy j in time t, her or his expected payoff of
𝑗

choosing strategy j in time t is denoted as 𝜋𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑧(𝑡)) and we assume player i in time t has
𝑗

a numerical attraction 𝐴𝑖 (𝑡). Also, we assume the numerical attraction determines the
probability of choosing strategy j in round t + 1 by the following logistic function:
𝑗
𝑃𝑖 (𝑡 + 1) =

𝑗
𝜆𝐴 (𝑡)
𝑒 𝑖
𝜆𝐴𝑘
𝑖 (𝑡)
∑𝑚
𝑘=1 𝑒

(3).

The new parameter 𝜆 in equation (3) is the player i’s sensitivity for mapping
attractions into choice probabilities. Numerically speaking, if 𝜆 equals a number not
statistically different from zero, we know that player i chooses his or her strategies
randomly (in our setting, player i chooses each management options at the probability of
about 1/6). If 𝜆 equals a significantly large number, we can see that player i chooses the
most attractive strategies more often than others.
We assume the attraction of player i of choosing strategy j in period t is determined
by the attraction in period t – 1, and the expected payoff of choosing strategy j in period t.
The attraction for each strategy in each round of the experiment are updated based on the
following equation:
𝑗

𝐴𝑖 (𝑡) =

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝛷𝑁(𝑡−1)𝐴𝑖 (𝑡−1)+[𝛿+(1−𝛿)𝐼𝐹(𝑠𝑖 ,𝑠𝑖 (𝑡))]𝜋𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 ,𝑧(𝑡))

(4).

𝑁(𝑡)

In equation (4), 𝑁(𝑡) is a weight on the past attractions which follows the updating
𝑗

method: 𝑁(𝑡) = 𝛷 ∗ (1 − 𝜅) ∗ 𝑁(𝑡 − 1) + 1. The binary variable function I𝐹(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖 (𝑡))
is equal to zero if strategy j is not the strategy chosen by player i in round t. Otherwise, the
indicator is equal to one. The parameter is 𝛷 a discount variable of previous attractions. If
player i forgets or ignores previous experience deliberately because of various reasons, for
example, uncertainty environment, the value of 𝛷 would be small. In the learning process,
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the strength of forgone payoff of strategies that player i dose not choose in period t is
weighted by the parameter 𝛿. A small 𝛿 would indicate that subjects tend to be reinforced
by previous choices. Parameter 𝜅 is the discount rate of the experience weight 𝑁(𝑡).
𝑗

𝑗

Variables 𝑁(𝑡) and 𝐴𝑖 (𝑡) have initial value 𝑁(0) and 𝐴𝑖 (0).
We follow previous literature [e.g., Feri et al., 2010] and use the maximum
likelihood method to estimate the parameters for each treatment, and the following
equation gives the likelihood function:
𝑠𝑖 (𝑡)

𝐿(𝜆, 𝛷, 𝛿, 𝜅, 𝑁(0)) = ∏6𝑖=1[∏45
𝑡=1 𝑃𝑖

(𝑡)].

(9)

In equation (9), we impose the following necessary restrictions on the parameters
1

λ, Φ, δ, κ, and 𝑁(0)：𝜆 ∊ (0, ∞), 𝛷, 𝛿, 𝜅 ∊ (0,1] and 𝑁(0) ∊ (0, 1−(1−𝜅)∗𝛷] to make sure
the model is identifiable. All experience weights and attractions are updated over time
𝑗

when estimating the parameters of the model except the initial value of 𝐴𝑖 (0). We estimate
the initial attractions of all strategies using the first period data based on the method
proposed in Ho, Wang, and Camerer [2008]. For each treatment, we use the data of 42
players (seven groups) decisions over 45 rounds to estimate the learning parameters.
3.3.2 Estimation results of the EWA learning model
We present the estimates for parameters λ, Φ, δ, κ, and 𝑁(0) in the EWA learning
model in the Tables 3.4a and 3.4b. Table 3.4a reports the parameter estimates of the
treatments in which the experiment participants only know their own payoffs and ambient
pollution levels after each round of the experiment. Table 3.4b contains the estimation
results of the treatments in which the players know additional information about the actions
of all group members.
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The first parameter λ in all treatments are all statistically significantly greater than
zero, which implies that the participants of the experiment do not choose their strategies
randomly in all treatments under the ambient tax policy. This result is not surprising since
we can observe a non-uniform distribution of decisions in all treatments. When the
participants cannot observe group members’ strategies, the ability of mapping attractions
into choice probabilities decreases as the uncertainty levels increases (Table 3.4a, row 1).
The estimate of λ for the treatment without individual-level environmental uncertainty
(Treatment A) equals 1.72, which is statistically significantly higher than the value of λ
(1.01) in the low uncertainty treatment (Treatment B). Hence, if the participants in the two
treatments face the same attractions, the participants experiencing the low individual-level
environmental uncertainty are less likely to choose the strategy with the highest attractions
than the participants in the certainty treatment. By the same token, the participants in the
treatment with high individual-level environmental uncertainty are less sensitive to map
attractions into choice probabilities than the participants experiencing low individual-level
environmental uncertainty. In general, the increasing uncertainty level induces more
randomness of choosing strategies under the ambient tax policy.
When the participants can observe group members’ actions, the ability to map
attractions into probabilities substantially increases in the uncertainty treatments. By
comparing the first rows of Table 3.4a and Table 3.4b, we can see that additional
information about group members’ actions does not affect the values of λ in the certainty
treatments (Treatments A and D). However, the values of λ in uncertainty treatments with
information disclosure (Treatments E and F) are statistically significantly greater than
corresponding values of λ in uncertainty treatments without information disclosure

87

(Treatments B and C). The trend that increasing uncertainty induces randomness of choices
still holds. In general, we can conclude that under the ambient tax policies knowing group
members’ actions help the participants to allocate more probabilities to the strategies with
the same attractions.
The value of Φ are all statistically significantly greater than zero, and the values are
all relatively close to one, ranging from 0.88 to 0.98, reflecting that the decay rate of
previous attractions are low and the previous play has a strong influence on the attractions.
The values of Φ are notably significantly larger in uncertainty treatments than in certainty
treatments. It implies that under the ambient tax policy, previous experience is significant
to the participants in an uncertain environment and they discard old experience more
quickly in without any uncertainty. However, we find that the additional information about
the group members’ actions does not affect the decay rate of previous attractions (second
rows of Table 3.4a and 3.4b).
We observe δ which are not statistically different from zero in all the uncertainty
treatments. It indicates that the participants neglect the possible payoffs from unchosen
strategies under the individual-level environmental uncertainty. Their learning type is close
to reinforcement learning type, which means they are mainly reinforced by the payoffs they
received during the experiments. In both certainty treatments, the values of δ are
statistically significantly different from zero. It demonstrates that the participants who do
not experience the environmental uncertainty at the individual level under the ambient tax
policy take into account the hypothetical payoffs from unchosen strategies and put a
positive weight on those strategies. In other words, they practice belief-based learning. We
do not observe a significant impact of information disclosure on the weight of unchosen
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strategies since the differences of the values of δ are not statistically significant (the third
row of Tables 3.4a and3.4b).
The estimates for 𝑁(0) are the initial values of the weights on past attractions in
the six treatments (last row, Tables 3.4a and 3.4b). It reflects the pregame experience of
the participants of each treatment. Based on record of our post-experiment conversation
parts, none the participants did not experience such types of experiment before. Therefore,
it is not surprising that the values of 𝑁(0) are very different from each other in those
treatments given that we have between-subjects experimental design. Also, it makes senses
that the levels of environmental uncertainty and the different sets of information disclosed
to the participants have no systematic impact on the weights of past attractions.
Estimates of 𝜅(t), the discount rates of 𝑁(𝑡), however, are systematically different
across treatments. When the participants cannot observe group members’ actions, the
discount rates increase as the levels of environmental uncertainty increases. It implies that
the participants significantly update their weights on the past attractions under uncertain
environment as the experiment continues. We can see from the fourth row of Table 3.4a
that the values of κ are statistically significantly different from zero in the uncertainty
treatments. The magnitude of updating increases when they experience an environment
with more variation. The trend also holds where the participants can observe group
members’ actions (fourth row, Table 3.4b). The ability to know group members’ actions
generally induces decreases in the discount rates (fourth row of Table 3.4a and 3.4b).
To sum up, the estimates of the EWA learning model suggest that NPS polluters
update their experience about their strategies over time and they may only be reinforced
previous plays and payoffs, especially in an uncertainty environment. This finding is likely
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to explain in part why behavior does not converge to a certain level as predicted after many
rounds of interactions under the ambient tax policy. Environmental uncertainty degrades
the NPS polluters’ ability to map the attractions into probabilities, which may induce more
randomness of strategy choices. This effect becomes larger as the uncertainty level
increases, and it potentially induces more variation of strategy choices. Also, we found
instances where the environmental uncertainty makes the NPS polluters neglect the payoffs
of the unchosen strategies. Therefore, it could be one reason that the ambient tax policy
does not induce perfectly desirable behavior all the time. The information set is also
important to the learning process in the experiment. Knowing group members’ actions may
enhance NPS polluters’ abilities to map the attractions into the choice probabilities in an
uncertain environment. In the next section, we integrate the estimation results of the EWA
learning into an ABM to scale up the findings we have from the experiment.

3.4 ABM framework, calibration, and simulation results
In this section, we describe the framework and calibration of the ABM which is
used to scale up the NPS polluters’ behavior. Its simulation results are presented after the
description of the ABM. We use the Python language to build up the ABM.
3.4.1 The ABM framework and calibration
The ABM uses the same environment as in the laboratory experiment so that we
can have direct comparisons between the real experiment participants and simulated
agents. We create 1200 agents and divide into 200 groups. Each group with six agents is
located in an isolated watershed, and their production activities increase their profit but
degrade their local water quality. Identical to the laboratory experiment, the level of
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degradation depends on their management options and their environment which is changed
by the uncertainty treatment types. The information sets provided to the agent also vary
across treatments. The agents in a group interact with group members for 450 rounds
through the ambient tax policy. That is, one agent’s choice of management options affect
its own and group members’ profit through the ambient tax policy.
We use the estimation results of the EWA learning model to specify agents’
behavior. This specification ensures that the agents adapt their strategies over time, as well
as autonomy and heterogeneity of the simulated agents. We assume the agents maximize
their expected profits, weigh forgone payoffs, update old experience, be reinforced by
previous actions and learn to adapt their strategies based on different environment and
information sets. After processing all the information, agents update their attractions of
each management options at the end of each period. They make their final choices based
on a logistic function same as the choice function in the EWA learning model. In a nutshell,
the management options with the highest attractions in period t have the most top
probabilities to be chosen by the agents in period t +1. Worth to mention, the static Nash
equilibrium of each period in the ABM is unique and identical to the dominant Nash
strategies in the experiment.
Fehr and Fischbacher [2003] point out the initial plays matter in public goods
games. To test the sensitivity of initial choices in our setting, we initiate the ABM with
three methods. One is to randomly choose arrays of management options, which means
each agent choose each management options with equal probability of 1/6. The second
way is to use the pre-experiment attraction data that we estimate for the EWA learning
model estimation to calculate six arrays of prospects respecting to six treatments. The
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agents choose the management options independently based on the calculated probability
arrays. The third method is to use specific management option combinations. For example,
we try to start from the collusive equilibrium or status quo strategies. We also increase the
number of group members in each group to echo the group size effect in the public goods
literature [e.g., Isaac and Walker, 1988].
3.4.2 Simulation results of the ABM
We show part of the simulation results of the ABM in the Figure 3.3a and 3.3b.
This cluster of simulation uses the second method we describe in Part 4.1 to decide the
initial condition of the simulation. The Figure 3.3a exhibits the dynamic behavior of 1200
agents over 450 rounds of the treatments in which the experiment participants only know
their payoffs and ambient pollution levels. Figure 3b displays the evolution of all the
agents’ behavior when they can get additional information about the actions of all group
members.
From the simulation results, we can see that the agents’ strategies do not converge
to a point even though there are many rounds of interactions and plenty of interacted agents,
no matter what the combinations of learning parameters are. It seems that choices of the
agents who are not exposed to the environmental uncertainty have less variation than
choices under uncertainty. Also, when the agents know group members’ actions, it appears
that the additional information decreases choice variation under the environmental
uncertainty. Those general findings agree with the outcomes that we find from the
experiment.
We also find that the simulation results can approximately match the participant’s
behavior in the experiment under the ambient tax policy in the uncertainty treatments when
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there is no additional information disclosed to the participants. The average individual
emission levels of the experiment participants are all slightly above the social optimum.
Miao et al. (2017) show that the environmental uncertainty at the individual level induces
under-abatement. The simulation results seem to support the results at the large scale and
in the extended period. Also, we find the environmental uncertainty increases the variety
of decisions in the ABM (Figure 3.3a). This finding also coincides with the outcome of the
experiment. However, we cannot observe over-abatement behavior in the ABM when the
agents do know their group members’ actions, and they do not face any environmental
uncertainty. We conjecture that in the collusive experiment equilibrium may play a role in
the choices of management options and the participants find ways to cooperate with each
other to some degree. The first assumption of the EWA learning model is that the
participants play a non-cooperative game. Therefore, the agents in the ABM may lack the
ability to find a way to cooperate with each other. It could be one potential caveat of using
the EWA learning model to specify the agent behavior in an ABM.
When the information about group members’ action is provided to the agents in the
ABM and the participants in experiments, their behavior is similar in the uncertainty
treatments in the first few periods (Figure 3.2b and 3.3b). However, after a few rounds of
interactions, the agents in the ABM form a trend to decrease their emission levels under
the high level of environmental uncertainty. The choices after many rounds of interactions
oscillate around the socially optimal level. With a more in-depth inspection of this
behavior, we find that the large shocks, in the form of significant negative payoffs,
decreases the attractions of choices with emission levels exceeding the socially optimal

93

emission. We cannot observe this trend from the experiment data, which can be caused by
the lack of enough interactions.
These results suggest that after many rounds of learning, for example, several
hurricanes in a short period, people understand the importance of adaptation and begin the
adaptation process and react to others’ adaptation behavior. However, in the experiment,
because of the limited time in the laboratory, the shocks in the high environmental
uncertainty treatments may not build up enough negative attractions. In the postexperiment nonbinding conversation with the experiment participants after the experiment
sessions, most people thought that the shocks would come back after many rounds given
one shock happened, and they usually increased their emission levels after encountering
any shocks. The experimental data indeed reveal this type of behavior. When the agents
can observe group members’ behavior, and they experience no environmental uncertainty,
their behavior is close to the participants’ behavior in the experiment.
We change the way we define the initial conditions of the ABM to check the
sensitivities of initial choices. We find that the dynamic behavior of the agents is not
sensitive to the initial decisions under the ambient tax policy. Their choice quickly
converges to the range of options in the first cluster of ABM as reported above. The
simulation results are not sensitive to the group size, either.

3.5 Conclusion
We run a laboratory experiment to infer how the NPS polluters adapt their strategies
under the ambient tax policy and how the environmental uncertainty at the individual level
and information disclosure affect their learning patterns. We find that NPS polluters may
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be mainly reinforced by previous plays under the ambient tax policy, especially they
experience environmental uncertainty. This results could partially explain why equilibria
cannot be reached in most economic experiments studying ambient-based policies. The
increased level of environmental uncertainty decreases NPS polluters’ ability to choose
options with high attractions. Also, the ability to know group members’ actions may help
NPS polluters to make better decisions.
The simulation results of the ABM reveal that the agents calibrated by the EWA
learning models can mimic subjects’ behavior in the experiment. Also, the results show
that the NPS polluters’ behavior may not converge to socially desired behavior even in the
long run under the ambient-based policy. Also, the results tell us that the shocks under high
environmental uncertainty could only be effective in the long term given they can observe
other group members’ actions. Initial choices and group size seemingly do not affect the
effectiveness of the ambient tax policy.
In the future work, we may change the environment of the ABM where the agents
interact with other group members. More realistic production functions, abetment
functions, damage functions and spatial information can be introduced into the
environment while we keep the learning parameters of the agents unchanged. After running
the ABM, the more realistic setting can offer more external validities to test the ambient
tax policy when field studies are still hard to accomplish.
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Table 3.1: Treatment tables
Treatment
A
B
C

Label
No information,
Certainty
No information, Low
uncertainty
No information, High
certainty
Information, Certainty

D
E
F

Information, Low
uncertainty
Information, High
certainty

Information about others group members' decisions

Uncertainty Level

No

Certainty

No

Low uncertainty

No

High uncertainty

Yes

Certainty

Yes

Low uncertainty

Yes

High uncertainty
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Table 3.2: Function forms and parameterization
Parameter Values
Certainty
p = 6.00, A =0.02, B =
0.05, C = 350

Parameter Values
Low uncertainty
p = 6, A =0.02, B =
0.05, C = 350

Parameter Values
High uncertainty
p = 6, A =0.02, B = 0.05,
C = 350

E = 1/3750, F = 4/75, ε
=μ + σ2/2

E = 1/2750, F = 2/275, , ε
~ log N(1.25,0.5)

E = 1/2750, F = 2/275, ε
~ log N(0.875,1)

r

I=6

I=6

I=6

H*x

H = 30

H = 30

H = 30

t*x

t = 30

t = 30

t = 30

Description

Function Form

Profit function
π (yi, ai)

p*yi - (Ayi2 + B ai2) + C

Emission Function
ri(yi, ai, ε)

(Eyi2 - Fai0.5)* ε /(μ + σ2/2)

Ambient pollution
function x(r)
Damage function
D(x)
Tax function
T(x)

I

i 1

i
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Table 3.3: Profit-maximizing values of production and abatement

Management Option
#6
#5
#4
#3
#2
#1

(Expected) Emissions (r)
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00

Abatement (a)
0.00
1.46
2.62
3.93
5.69
8.67

Production (y)
150.00
137.81
123.78
107.91
89.32
65.87

Profit (π)
800.00
796.92
785.92
763.81
724.73
654.68
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Table 3.4a: Parameter estimates of the EWA learning model for no-information
disclosure treatments

Parameters
λ

Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C
1.72**
1.01***
0.22***
(0.87)
(0.16)
(0.08)
0.88***
0.95***
0.93***
Φ
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
0.13**
0.12
0.02
δ
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.13)
0.01
0.06***
0.38**
κ
(0.08)
(0.02)
(0.16)
4.40
1.06**
0.30**
N(0)
(3.15)
(0.48)
(0.14)
N = 1890 for each treatment. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1

Table 3.4b: Parameter estimates of the EWA learning model for information
disclosure treatments
Parameters
λ

Treatment D Treatment E Treatment F
1.45***
1.73***
0.46***
(0.26)
(0.07)
(0.08)
0.90***
0.93***
0.98***
Φ
0.11
(0.01)
(0.01)
0.18**
0.00
0.12
δ
(0.07)
(0.00)
(0.10)
0.03
0.00
0.12***
κ
(0.03)
(0.00)
0.02
3.06***
4.07***
0.66***
N(0)
(1.01)
0.71
(0.24)
N = 1890 for each treatment. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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Figure 3.1a: Average social efficiency over time (No information disclosure)
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Figure 3.1b: Average social efficiency over time (With information disclosure)
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Figure 3.2a: Average individual emission over time (no information disclosure)
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Figure 3.2b: Average individual emission over time (with information disclosure)
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Figure 3.3a: Simulated average individual emission over time (no information
disclosure)

Figure 3.3b: Simulated average individual emission over time (with information
disclosure
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POLICY IMPLICATION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
It has been well established that economic inefficiency in the nonpoint source
(NPS) pollution problems stems from information asymmetries [Farzin and Kaplan,
2004]. The size of emissions cannot be inferred or observed with reasonable cost
because NPS pollution comes from diffuse sources and is in the form of excess
fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides. For example, it is typically prohibitively costly
to get information about how much pollution comes from one specific parcel of land in
the field, such as a residential lawn or a plot of agricultural land. Information
asymmetries between the environmental regulator and those whose activities generate
pollution emissions make traditional emission tax or regulation ineffective [Xepapadeas,
2011]. Alternative policies designed by economists to control NPS pollution are
generally divided into two categories: regulatory approaches [e.g., ambient-based
instruments (Segerson, 1988; Xepapadeas, 1992; Xepapadeas, 1995; Horan et al., 1998;
Hansen, 2002) and input taxes (Griffin and Bromley, 1982; Shortle and Dunn, 1986)]
and voluntary approaches [e.g., voluntary-threat approach (Segerson and Wu, 2006; Li,
2013), and “pay-the-polluter” approach (Hanley et al., 1998)].
In this dissertation, I examine how information affects NPS polluters’ behavior
in a voluntary program and under a regulatory policy. In particular, I investigate the
effects of informational nudges and financial incentives on homeowners’ decisions of
choosing lawn care services through a field experiment. Additionally, I test the effects
of environmental uncertainty at the individual level and information disclosure on
polluters’ behavior under an ambient tax policy in a laboratory experiment and one
agent-based model.
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In the voluntary program, I find that informational nudges and financial
incentives may effectively change homeowners’ behavior. However, I find that the two
types of intervention are not complementary in promoting environment-friendly
behavior. In the laboratory experiment where I use students to represent NPS polluters
to test the effectiveness and efficiency of the ambient tax policy, I find that
environmental uncertainty at the individual level increases the NPS pollution level and
thus jeopardize the efficiency of the ambient tax policy. Also, I discover that
information disclosure, giving the laboratory subjects the ability to observe other group
members’ actions, lower the NPS pollution level. However, information disclosure
induces over-abetment behavior, especially when there is an environment with certainty,
and therefore lowers the efficiency of the ambient tax policy. When I use agents in the
ABM to represent NPS polluters to investigate their behavior in the long run, I discover
similar treatment effects of environmental uncertainty. High level of environmental
uncertainty, however, creates plenty of negative payoff shocks and induces pollution
reduction in the long run when agents can observe group members’ behavior.
Results from this dissertation research suggest that information is vital in
managing NPS pollution, whether in a voluntary program or under a regulatory policy,
but that an environmental regulator should use information carefully and strategically
in designing policy to reduce NPS pollution. Current solutions to NPS pollution problem
rely heavily on voluntary adoption of best management practices. Financial incentives
or technical assistance are often used in the farming sector. Information to nudge
environmental friendly behavior to reduce NPS pollution is commonly used in outreach
programs. Our results imply a potential tension between informational nudges and
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financial incentives in the context of the lawn care practices. Subsidizing or nudging
homeowners may both work to change their behavior so that desired outcomes can be
achieved, but both of them can be costly. Using both solutions together do not increase
behavior changes significantly in the extensive margin compared to using one of the
solutions alone. Thus, our results further imply that the regulator needs to design
voluntary programs cautiously to reduce NPS pollution, especially when information
nudges and financial incentives are used together. Cost-benefit analysis should be
conducted to estimate strengths and weakness of both solutions before any
implementation. Also, targeting the right population may help improve the efficiency
of policy since results from the voluntary program suggest different strategies work for
different people depending on their degree of environmental preferences. Specifically,
financial incentives may better change the behavior of people who have already
possessed the information of nudges. Conversely, informational nudges may have a
significant effect on those people who may develop less environmental awareness.
Recently, budgets used for voluntary programs to reduce NPS pollution has
been limited in the United States. Congress has continuously cut the budget
tremendously for U.S. Department of Agriculture conservation programs, which are the
primary source of funding to support voluntary adoption of best management practices
[Shortle et al., 2012]. This increasingly budget-constrained situation underscores the
demand for alternative policy approaches if water quality goals are to be achieved.
Although according to the literature, there are no applications of ambient-based policy
in the field, it is one of the promising policy based on a series of theoretical research
and a dozen of empirical analyses in the laboratory. I envision that ambient-based policy
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instruments are the critical solutions to the nonpoint source pollutions because of two
advantages. First, they target ambient pollution level and do not require firm-specific
information and thus reduce the complication of policy design compared to other
proposed policy instruments, such as input-based incentives. Second, they are optimal
solutions to both point and nonpoint source pollution so that we do not have to devise
two separate incentive systems to reduce pollution if both types of pollution exist in a
watershed.
Despite the advantages of ambient-based policy instruments, their efficiency and
impact on pollution abatement are sensitive to how those instruments are designed.
Based on the results of previous literature and this dissertation, we understand that one
subset of ambient-based policy instruments are more effective and efficient than others
and several restrictions may help an environmental regulator to improve overall social
efficiency. Specifically, the ambient tax seems to be the most suitable one among all the
ambient-based policy instruments because of its ability to eliminate the possible
inefficient collusive behavior.
Various theoretical and experimental studies to date have allowed to us
understand multiple theoretical properties of the ambient tax policy. However, it has yet
to be implemented in the field. As the first step, I recommend that the field experiments
start with a relatively small watershed with relatively few, homogeneous polluters.
Involving too many polluters worsens the balance budgeting between damages and tax
payments since the ambient tax is a collective penalty. Also, heterogeneity among
polluters decreases social efficiency based previous experimental studies. Moreover, the
target which triggers the ambient tax needs to be set with care. Although the theoretical
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literature demonstrates that the target can be arbitrary and some experimental research
also suggests that social efficiency does not have significant change when we vary the
target, my experimental results provide evidence that a target below the optimum
reduces social efficiency most due to over-abatement behavior. Therefore, I conclude
that the environmental regulator can choose neither a too low target nor a too high one.
If it is too low, it may induce over-abatement behavior because of various reasons, such
as communication. If it is too high, the environmental regulator cannot achieve desired
environmental outcomes. It is critical to obtain the reliable water quality data to
approximate the social optimum and may need to be flexible so that the target can be
adjusted based on long-term trends in water quality patterns, specific cases, and policy
outcomes. Also, previous literature suggests that it is crucial to reduce error and increase
measurement accuracy when monitoring ambient pollution level because uncertainty in
ambient pollution measurement lowers social efficiency. Furthermore, my experimental
results indicate that environmental uncertainty may induce nonpoint source polluters’
under-abatement behavior, and therefore, this vital feature of NPS pollution also
requires the flexible design of the target.
Future research on ambient-based policy instruments may focus on searching
for close analogs to such instruments. Ideally, different policy designs need to be tested
using field experiments. If close analogs cannot be found in the field, demonstration
projects that further show their effectiveness and efficiency may be helpful for decision
making. While all these future research directions are temporarily infeasible, we may
step back, look into the existing data and find better models to describe subjects’
behavior under the ambient-based policy. We can further test the policy using the ABM
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techniques, which may break through the limitations of laboratory experiments and
expand the possibility of research such as integrating behavior in the laboratory with
real-world environmental data to produce case-specific results.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I: Field experiment survey

North East Water Resources Network Field Experiment Survey
[Italic part in this appendix was not shown in the online survey.]

Q1
Welcome to the University of Rhode Island’s survey on lawn care and sustainable
practices.
Thank you for your participation in this important survey. Your response will help us
understand how homeowners make decisions about lawn care practices. Before we
begin, please answer a few eligibility questions.
Please click ‘Next page>>’ to begin.
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Screening questions: (Q2 – Q7)
Q2
Which state do you live in? (Please choose one)
 Rhode Island (1)
 Massachusetts (2)
 Connecticut (3)
 Other (4)
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Display This Question:
If Which state do you live in? Massachusetts Is Selected
Q3
What is your zip code? (Please choose one)
A list of zip codes was displayed.
Display This Question:
If Which state do you live in? Connecticut Is Selected
Q4
What is your zip code? (Please choose one)
A list of zip codes was displayed.
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Display This Question:
If Which state do you live in? Other Is Not Selected
And What is your zip code? - Other Is Not Selected
And What is your zip code? - Other Is Not Selected
Q5
Does your current residence have a lawn?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
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Display This Question:
If Which state do you live in? Other Is Not Selected
And What is your zip code? - Other Is Not Selected
And Does your current residence have a lawn? No Is Not Selected
And What is your zip code? - Other Is Not Selected
Q6
Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one)
 Myself/Other member(s) of my household (1)
 Lawn care company (2)
 Landlord/Complex management (3)
 Friend/Neighbor (4)
 Someone else but not a professional (5)
 Other (Please specify) (6) ____________________

118

Display This Question:
If Who maintains your lawn? Lawn care company Is Selected
Q7
Which lawn care company did you hire in 2016? (Please choose one)
 A Cut Above (1)
 A. Paliotta (2)
 Countyview Landscaping (3)
 Cryan Landscaping (4)
 Dana Designs (5)
 Dapontes Landscaping (6)
 It’s About Thyme Landscaping (7)
 McGeoghs Turf Mgt (8)
 Murdock Landscaping (9)
 SeaScape LawnCare (10)
 None the above (11)
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Introduction and Survey Part I (Q8 - Q17)

Q8
Dear Homeowner,
Welcome to the University of Rhode Island’s survey on residential lawn care. This
survey is part of a study on decisions related to water quality funded by the National
Science Foundation. The results of this survey will help us understand how homeowners
make decisions about lawn care practices in southern New England.
This survey will take about 15 minutes to complete. As a small thank you gift, all
participants who are eligible for the study will receive a $2 Amazon e-gift card. The gift
card will be emailed to you. You can then use it yourself or donate to a
school/organization of your choice.
Please be assured that the information you provide is completely confidential. It will not
be disclosed to anyone without your permission. Study findings will only be presented
in summaries where individual answers cannot be identified.
Your participation is very important to us if we are to gain a fair and accurate
understanding of households’ decisions and opinions. However, you can choose not to
answer any questions or withdraw from the study at any time.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Dr. Emi Uchida (Associate
Professor, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode
Island). You may reach her by email (euchida@uri.edu) or by phone (401-874-4586).
In addition, you may contact the office of the Vice President for Research and Economic
Development, 70 Lower College Rd., Suite 2, Kingston, RI (401-874-4328). This
survey has been reviewed according to University of Rhode Island Institutional Review
Board procedures for research involving human subjects.
By clicking the following “Next page>>” button, you agree that:
• You have read the above information;
• You understand that your participation is voluntary;
• You are at least 18 years of age.
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Q9
Part I: Your lawn care practices in the year 2016
In this section, we will ask a few questions about your lawn care practices in the year
2016.

121

Display This Question:
If Who maintains your lawn? Lawn care company Is Selected
Q10 You informed us that you hired a lawn care company to maintain your lawn in
2016. Please tell us which of the following services were provided by the lawn care
company. (Choose all that apply)
 Watering (1)
 Fertilizing (2)
 Mowing (3)
 Aeration (4)
 Seeding (5)
 Insect control (6)
 Disease control (7)
 Weed control (8)
 Crabgrass control (9)
 Other (Please specify) (10) ____________________
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Display This Question:
If Who maintains your lawn? Lawn care company Is Selected
Q11
Which of the following actions were used by the lawn care company you hired in 2016?
Yes (1)
No (2)
I don't know (3)
Conducted a soil test 


Used conventional

fertilizers





Used slow release

nitrogen fertilizer





Used
fertilizers













Hand-watered spots
during very dry 
periods





Cleaned driveway
and sidewalks after 
applying fertilizer





Did not treat under
windy or rainy 
conditions





Spot treated weeds

with herbicide





organic



Left your grass
clippings on the 
lawn
Mowed your lawn
between 3 to 4 
inches
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Display This Question:
If Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Myself/Other member(s) of my
household Is Selected
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Friend/Neighbor Is Selected
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Someone else but not a
professional Is Selected
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Other (Please specify) Is
Selected
Q12
Which of the following actions did your household or the person managing your lawn
take to maintain your lawn in 2016? (Choose all that apply)
 Watering (1)
 Fertilizing (2)
 Mowing (3)
 Aerating (4)
 Seeding (5)
 Insect control (6)
 Disease Control (7)
 Weed control (8)
 Crabgrass control (9)
 Other (Please specify) (10) ____________________
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Display This Question:
If Who maintains your lawn? Myself/Other member(s) of my household Is
Selected…
Q13
Which of the following practices did your household or the person managing your
lawn follow to maintain your lawn in 2016?
Yes (1)
No (2)
I don't know (3)
Conducted a soil test 
Used conventional

fertilizers









Used slow release

nitrogen fertilizer





Used
fertilizers







Left your grass
clippings on the 
lawn













Cleaned driveway
and sidewalks after 
applying fertilizer





Did not treat under
windy or rainy 
conditions





Spot treated weeds

with herbicide





organic

Mowed your lawn
between 3 to 4 
inches
Hand-watered spots
during very dry 
periods

Display This Question:
If Who maintains your lawn? Lawn care company Is Selected
Q14
How much did your household spend to hire the lawn care company in 2016? (In US
dollars) (Please enter a NUMBER in the box.)
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Display This Question:
If Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Myself/Other member(s) of my
household Is Selected
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Friend/Neighbor Is Selected
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Someone else but not a
professional Is Selected
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Other (Please specify) Is
Selected
Q15 How much did your household or the person managing your lawn spend in TOTAL
in 2016 for your lawn care? (In US Dollars). Please include expenses for fertilizers,
pesticides, seeds and other materials you can think of. (Do not include
machinery.) (Please enter a NUMBER in the box.)
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Display This Question:
If Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Myself/Other member(s) of my
household Is Selected
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Someone else but not a
professional Is Selected
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Friend/Neighbor Is Selected
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Other (Please specify) Is
Selected
Q16 How many hours per month on average did your household or the person managing
your lawn spend on maintaining your lawn last season? (Please enter a NUMBER in
the box.)

127

Q17
What is the size of your lawn in ACRES? Please provide your best estimate. (Please
enter a NUMBER in the box. For example, if your lawn is half an acre, please enter
0.5.)
For your reference:
 One football field (including the two end zones) = 1.3 acres
 An official basketball court = 0.1 acre.
 Average floor area in new single-family houses in the northeast U.S. in
2010 = 0.06 acre.
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Survey Part II: treatments (Information treatments + Financial Incentives)
Q18

Part II: About Green Certified Lawn Care Companies
With proper care, it is possible to have a sustainable, responsible and healthy lawn.
In this section, you will find important information about services provided by ‘greencertified’ lawn care companies. Please read the information carefully. We will ask a
few questions following the information.
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One of the following three treatments will be randomly displayed at the same
probability for each survey.
Information Treatment 1 (Q19 – Q28)
Q19
Since 2015, Rhode Island (RI) has a “Green Certification” program for lawn care
companies. As of January 2017, 10 lawn care companies are green-certified by the RI
Department of Environmental Management.

To be certified, lawn care companies must fulfill selected best management practices to
protect water quality, conserve water, and contribute to the sustainability of the
landscape.
Here are some practices the green-certified companies have adopted:
 mow appropriately (maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches),
 fertilize appropriately (e.g., fertilize based on a soil test, use non-phosphorous,
slow-release fertilizer),
 use safer pesticides (e.g., use mostly granular pesticides to reduce product drift
and customer exposure) etc. when maintaining lawns.
Green-certified lawn care companies need to adopt additional best management
practices to get re-certified every two years.
The NEXT graphic summarizes these practices.
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Q20
Here is a summary of what GREEN-CERTIFIED lawn care companies do.
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Q21
If you would like to know more about the lawn care practices commonly adopted by
green-certified lawn care, here are a few reputable sources*:
University of Rhode Island's Stormwater Solutions:
web.uri.edu/riss/take-action/simple-steps-at-home/around-the-yard/#FertilizeSparingly
University of Connecticut's Sustainable Landscaping:
http://www.sustainability.uconn.edu/sustain/turf/intro.html
University of Massachusetts' Turf Program:
https://ag.umass.edu/turf/publications-resources/best-management-practices
If you decide to check these websites out now, please click the above links and come
back to the survey within a few minutes to complete.
*Please note that the best management practices on the websites above are examples of
suggested practices. Each certified company chooses a set of practices to get greencertified and may not all adopt the same practice.
Did you check one or more of those websites?
 Yes, I did. (1)
 No, I did not. (2)
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Q22
In your opinion, which of the following lawn care practices do you think is effective in
sustaining water quality? (Choose all that apply)
 Conduct a soil test (1)
 Maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches (2)
 Fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer (3)
 Clean up fertilizer from driveways, walkways, and roads after application (4)
 Use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed (5)
 Leave areas untreated around water bodies and wetlands (6)
 None the above (7)
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Q23
Were you aware that Rhode Island has a Green Certification program for lawn care
companies?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)

Display This Question:
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is
Selected
And How much did your household spend to hire the lawn care company in 2016?
(In US dollars)&nbsp;&nbsp;(Please enter a NUMBER in the box.) $ Is Not Empty
Q24
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much
would you be willing to pay for their services for the entire season?
You stated that you paid $ x for your services in 2016. Please use your payment for lawn
care in 2016 as a reference.
Imagine that the green-certified lawn care companies will offer you the same services
as the company you hired in 2016, but use best management practices that
minimize the impact on water quality. Examples include:
• maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches
• water efficiently
• fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer
• use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed.
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Display This Question:
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is
Not Selected
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex
management Is Not Selected
And How much did your household or the person managing your law spend in
TOTAL in 2016 for your lawn care? (In US Dollars) Is Not Empty
And How many hours per month on average did your household or the person
managing your … Is Not Empty
Q25
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season?
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly
services:
• Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate, to avoid
over fertilizing
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control
• Pelletized limestone (early fall)
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.
For your information, you stated that your household spent $x annually and x hour(s)
each month on average to take care of your lawn in 2016. Please use these figures as a
reference.
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Display This Question:
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is
Selected
And How much did your household spend to hire the lawn care company in 2016?
(In US dollars)&nbsp;&nbsp;(Please enter a NUMBER in the box.) $ Is Empty
Q26
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much
would you be willing to pay for their services for the entire season?
Imagine that the green-certified lawn care companies will offer you the same services
as the company you hired in 2016, but use best management practices that
minimize the impact on water quality. Examples include:
• maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches
•water efficiently
• fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer
• use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed.
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Display This Question:
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is
Not Selected
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex
management Is Not Selected
And How much did your household or the person managing your lawn spend in
TOTAL in 2016 for your lawn care… $ Is Empty
Q27
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season?
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly
services: • Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate
to avoid over fertilizing
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control
• Pelletized limestone (early fall)
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.
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Display This Question:
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is
Not Selected
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex
management Is Not Selected
And There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If
you were to hire...Is Not Displayed
And How many hours per month o… Is Empty
Q28
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season?
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly
services:
• Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate, to avoid
over fertilizing
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control
• Pelletized limestone (early fall)
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.
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Information Treatment 2 (Q29 – Q42)
Q29

Part II---Section 1: Your lawn care and water quality
Here you will find information about how your lawn care can affect local water
quality depending on how you manage it. Please read the information carefully. We
will ask you one question following the information.
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Q30

Data Sources:
https://cfpub.epa.gov/npstbx/files/Norming_Survey_LawnCare_NewEngland_July201
0.pdf
http://www.stormwatercenter.net/Practice/131-Homeowner%20Survey.pdf
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Q31
In your opinion, which message from the previous figure was the most surprising to
you? (Choose one)
 Improper fertilizer can be harmful to our drinking water, fish and other aquatic life.
(1)
 Proper lawn care can make a difference in protecting our drinking water, fish and
other aquatic life. (2)
 74% of households fertilize their lawns. (3)
 Only 2% of households conduct a soil test before fertilizing their lawns. (4)
 40% of the households use the whole bag of fertilizer to avoid storage. (5)
 None of the above were surprising to me. (6)
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Q32
Part II---Section 2: About Green Certified Lawn Care Companies

With proper care, it is possible to have a sustainable, responsible and healthy lawn.
In this section, you will find important information about services provided by ‘greencertified’ lawn care companies. Please read the information carefully. We will ask a few
questions following the information.
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Q33
Since 2015, Rhode Island (RI) has a “Green Certification” program for lawn care
companies. As of January 2017, 10 lawn care companies are green-certified by the RI
Department of Environmental Management.

To be certified, lawn care companies must fulfill selected best management practices to
protect water quality, conserve water, and contribute to the sustainability of the
landscape.
Here are some practices the green-certified companies have adopted:
 mow appropriately (maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches),
 fertilize appropriately (e.g., fertilize based on a soil test, use non-phosphorous,
slow-release fertilizer),
 use safer pesticides (e.g., use mostly granular pesticides to reduce product drift
and customer exposure) etc. when maintaining lawns.
Green-certified lawn care companies need to adopt additional best management
practices to get re-certified every two years.
The NEXT graphic summarizes these practices.
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Q34
Here is a summary of what GREEN-CERTIFIED lawn care companies do.
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Q35
If you would like to know more about the lawn care practices commonly adopted by
green-certified lawn care, here are a few reputable sources*:
University of Rhode Island's Stormwater Solutions:
web.uri.edu/riss/take-action/simple-steps-at-home/around-the-yard/#FertilizeSparingly
University of Connecticut's Sustainable Landscaping:
http://www.sustainability.uconn.edu/sustain/turf/intro.html
University of Massachusetts' Turf Program:
https://ag.umass.edu/turf/publications-resources/best-management-practices
If you decide to check these websites out now, please click the above links and come
back to the survey within a few minutes to complete.
*Please note that the best management practices on the websites above are examples of
suggested practices. Each certified company chooses a set of practices to get greencertified and may not all adopt the same practice.
Did you check one or more of those websites?
 Yes, I did. (1)
 No, I did not. (2)
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Q36
In your opinion, which of the following lawn care practices do you think is effective in
sustaining water quality? (Choose all that apply)
 Conduct a soil test (1)
 Maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches (2)
 Fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer (3)
 Clean up fertilizer from driveways, walkways, and roads after application (4)
 Use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed (5)
 Leave areas untreated around water bodies and wetlands (6)
 None the above (7)
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Q37
Were you aware that Rhode Island has a Green Certification program for lawn care
companies?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
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Display This Question:
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is
Selected
And How much did your household spend to hire the lawn care company in 2016?
(In US dollars)&nbsp;&nbsp;(Please enter a NUMBER in the box.) $ Is Not Empty
Q38
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much
would you be willing to pay for their services for the entire season?
You stated that you paid $ x for your services in 2016. Please use your payment for lawn
care in 2016 as a reference.
Imagine that the green-certified lawn care companies will offer you the same services
as the company you hired in 2016, but use best management practices that
minimize the impact on water quality. Examples include:
• maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches
• water efficiently
• fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer
• use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed.
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Display This Question:
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is
Not Selected
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex
management Is Not Selected
And How much did your household or the person managing your law spend in
TOTAL in 2016 for your lawn care? (In US Dollars) Is Not Empty
And How many hours per month on average did your household or the person
managing your … Is Not Empty
Q39
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season?
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly
services:
• Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate, to avoid
over fertilizing
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control
• Pelletized limestone (early fall)
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.
For your information, you stated that your household spent $x annually and x hour(s)
each month on average to take care of your lawn in 2016. Please use these figures as a
reference.
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Display This Question:
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is
Selected
And How much did your household spend to hire the lawn care company in 2016?
(In US dollars)&nbsp;&nbsp;(Please enter a NUMBER in the box.) $ Is Empty
Q40
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much
would you be willing to pay for their services for the entire season?
Imagine that the green-certified lawn care companies will offer you the same services
as the company you hired in 2016, but use best management practices that
minimize the impact on water quality. Examples include:
• maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches
•water efficiently
• fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer
• use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed.
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Display This Question:
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is
Not Selected
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex
management Is Not Selected
And How much did your household or the person managing your lawn spend in
TOTAL in 2016 for your lawn care… $ Is Empty
Q41
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season?
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly
services: • Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate
to avoid over fertilizing
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control
• Pelletized limestone (early fall)
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.
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Display This Question:
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is
Not Selected
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex
management Is Not Selected
And There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If
you were to hire...Is Not Displayed
And How many hours per month o… Is Empty
Q42
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season?
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly
services:
• Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate, to avoid
over fertilizing
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control
• Pelletized limestone (early fall)
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.
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Information Treatment 3 (Q43 – Q58)
Q43

Part II---Section 1: Your lawn care and water quality
Here you will find information about how your lawn care can affect local water
quality depending on how you manage it. Please read the information carefully. We
will ask you one question following the information.
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Q44

Data Sources:
https://cfpub.epa.gov/npstbx/files/Norming_Survey_LawnCare_NewEngland_July201
0.pdf
http://www.stormwatercenter.net/Practice/131-Homeowner%20Survey.pdf
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Q45
In your opinion, which message from the previous figure was the most surprising to
you? (Please choose one)
 Improper fertilizer can be harmful to our drinking water, fish and other aquatic life.
(1)
 Proper lawn care can make a difference in protecting our drinking water, fish and
other aquatic life. (2)
 74% of households fertilize their lawns. (3)
 Only 2% of households conduct a soil test before fertilizing their lawns. (4)
 40% of the households use the whole bag of fertilizer to avoid storage. (5)
 None of the above were surprising to me. (6)
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Q46
Part II---Section 2: About Green Certified Lawn Care Companies

With proper care, it is possible to have a sustainable, responsible and healthy lawn.
In this section, you will find important information about services provided by ‘greencertified’ lawn care companies. Please read the information carefully. We will ask a few
questions following the information.
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Q47
Since 2015, Rhode Island (RI) has a “Green Certification” program for lawn care
companies. As of January 2017, 10 lawn care companies are green-certified by the RI
Department of Environmental Management.

To be certified, lawn care companies must fulfill selected best management practices to
protect water quality, conserve water, and contribute to the sustainability of the
landscape.
Here are some practices the green-certified companies have adopted:
 mow appropriately (maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches),
 fertilize appropriately (e.g., fertilize based on a soil test, use non-phosphorous,
slow-release fertilizer),
 use safer pesticides (e.g., use mostly granular pesticides to reduce product drift
and customer exposure) etc. when maintaining lawns.
Green-certified lawn care companies need to adopt additional best management
practices to get re-certified every two years.
The NEXT graphic summarizes these practices.
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Q48
Here is a summary of what GREEN-CERTIFIED lawn care companies do.
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Q49
If you would like to know more about the lawn care practices commonly adopted by
green-certified lawn care, here are a few reputable sources*:
University of Rhode Island's Stormwater Solutions:
web.uri.edu/riss/take-action/simple-steps-at-home/around-the-yard/#FertilizeSparingly
University of Connecticut's Sustainable Landscaping:
http://www.sustainability.uconn.edu/sustain/turf/intro.html
University of Massachusetts' Turf Program:
https://ag.umass.edu/turf/publications-resources/best-management-practices
If you decide to check these websites out now, please click the above links and come
back to the survey within a few minutes to complete.
*Please note that the best management practices on the websites above are examples of
suggested practices. Each certified company chooses a set of practices to get greencertified and may not all adopt the same practice.
Did you check one or more of those websites?
 Yes, I did. (1)
 No, I did not. (2)
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Q50
In your opinion, which of the following lawn care practices do you think is effective in
sustaining water quality? (Choose all that apply)
 Conduct a soil test (1)
 Maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches (2)
 Fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer (3)
 Clean up fertilizer from driveways, walkways, and roads after application (4)
 Use safer pesticides and do not spread more needed (5)
 Leave areas untreated around water bodies and wetlands (6)
 None the above (7)
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Q51
Below is additional information about GREEN-CERTIFIED lawn care companies.

161

Q52
Based on the previous figure, how much do you agree with the following statement:
"Many residents in Rhode Island are already hiring Green Certified lawn care
businesses."?
 Extremely agree (1)
 Moderately agree (2)
 Slightly agree (3)
 Slightly disagree (4)
 Moderately disagree (5)
 Extremely disagree (6)
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Q53
Were you aware that Rhode Island has a Green Certification program for lawn care
companies?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
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Display This Question:
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is
Selected
And How much did your household spend to hire the lawn care company in 2016?
(In US dollars)&nbsp;&nbsp;(Please enter a NUMBER in the box.) $ Is Not Empty
Q54
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much
would you be willing to pay for their services for the entire season?
You stated that you paid $ x for your services in 2016. Please use your payment for lawn
care in 2016 as a reference.
Imagine that the green-certified lawn care companies will offer you the same services
as the company you hired in 2016, but use best management practices that
minimize the impact on water quality. Examples include:
• maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches
• water efficiently
• fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer
• use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed.
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Display This Question:
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is
Not Selected
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex
management Is Not Selected
And How much did your household or the person managing your law spend in
TOTAL in 2016 for your lawn care? (In US Dollars) Is Not Empty
And How many hours per month on average did your household or the person
managing your … Is Not Empty
Q55
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season?
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly
services:
• Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate, to avoid
over fertilizing
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control
• Pelletized limestone (early fall)
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.
For your information, you stated that your household spent $x annually and x hour(s)
each month on average to take care of your lawn in 2016. Please use these figures as a
reference.
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Display This Question:
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is
Selected
And How much did your household spend to hire the lawn care company in 2016?
(In US dollars)&nbsp;&nbsp;(Please enter a NUMBER in the box.) $ Is Empty
Q56
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much
would you be willing to pay for their services for the entire season?
Imagine that the green-certified lawn care companies will offer you the same services
as the company you hired in 2016, but use best management practices that
minimize the impact on water quality. Examples include:
• maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches
•water efficiently
• fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer
• use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed.
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Display This Question:
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is
Not Selected
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex
management Is Not Selected
And How much did your household or the person managing your lawn spend in
TOTAL in 2016 for your lawn care… $ Is Empty
Q57
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season?
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly
services: • Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate
to avoid over fertilizing
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control
• Pelletized limestone (early fall)
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.
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Display This Question:
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is
Not Selected
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex
management Is Not Selected
And There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If
you were to hire...Is Not Displayed
And How many hours per month o… Is Empty
Q58
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season?
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly
services:
• Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate, to avoid
over fertilizing
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control
• Pelletized limestone (early fall)
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.
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One of the following four treatments will be randomly displayed at the same
probability for each survey. (The second treatment and the third treatment are
identical.)
Financial incentive Treatment 1: no incentive (Q59- Q60)
Q59
Given the information provided to you, how likely are you going to hire a greencertified lawn care company to manage your lawn? (Please choose one)
 Extremely likely (1)
 Moderately likely (2)
 Slightly likely (3)
 Slightly unlikely (4)
 Moderately unlikely (5)
 Extremely unlikely (6)
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Q60
What factors would affect your decision to contract into a green-certified lawn care
company? (Choose all that apply)
 How much it costs annually (1)
 The type of services provided (e.g., mowing, watering, fertilizing, etc.) (2)
 Number of visits for treatment (3)
 Type of environmentally-friendly practices (4)
 Other [please specify] (5) ____________________
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Financial incentive Treatment 2: 25% of contract (Q61 – Q64)
Q61
Congratulations!
You have been randomly selected to receive a rebate of 25% of your first year’s
annual contract fee with a green-certified lawn care company (up to $75). The rebate
is sponsored by a research grant.
Don’t miss this opportunity---this limited offer is valid only for contracts signed by May
31, 2017.
This is an actual rebate offer for you. If you contract with one of the three green-certified
lawn care companies listed at the end of this survey, you will receive the
rebate.
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Q62
How important is the rebate to your decision?
 Extremely important (1)
 Moderately important (2)
 Slightly important (3)
 Slightly unimportant (4)
 Moderately unimportant (5)
 Extremely unimportant (6)
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Q63
Given the information and rebate provided to you, how likely are you going to hire a
green-certified lawn care company to manage your lawn? (Please choose one) Note:
This is an actual rebate offer for you. If you contract with one of the three green-certified
lawn care companies listed at the end of this survey, you will receive the rebate.
 Extremely likely (1)
 Moderately likely (2)
 Slightly likely (3)
 Slightly unlikely (4)
 Moderately unlikely (5)
 Extremely unlikely (6)
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Q64
What factors would affect your decision to contract into a green-certified lawn care
company? (Choose all that apply)
 How much it costs annually (1)
 The type of services provided (e.g., mowing, watering, fertilizing, etc.) (2)
 Number of visits for treatment (3)
 Type of environmentally-friendly practices (4)
 Other [please specify] (5) ____________________
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Financial incentive Treatment 3: 25% of contract (Q65 – Q68)
Q65
Congratulations!
You have been randomly selected to receive a rebate of 25% of your first year’s
annual contract fee with a green-certified lawn care company (up to $75). The rebate
is sponsored by a research grant.
Don’t miss this opportunity---this limited offer is valid only for contracts signed by May
31, 2017.
This is an actual rebate offer for you. If you contract with one of the three green-certified
lawn care companies listed at the end of this survey, you will receive the
rebate.
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Q66
How important is the rebate to your decision?
 Extremely important (1)
 Moderately important (2)
 Slightly important (3)
 Slightly unimportant (4)
 Moderately unimportant (5)
 Extremely unimportant (6)
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Q67
Given the information and rebate provided to you, how likely are you going to hire a
green-certified lawn care company to manage your lawn? (Please choose one) Note:
This is an actual rebate offer for you. If you contract with one of the three green-certified
lawn care companies listed at the end of this survey, you will receive the rebate.
 Extremely likely (1)
 Moderately likely (2)
 Slightly likely (3)
 Slightly unlikely (4)
 Moderately unlikely (5)
 Extremely unlikely (6)
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Q68
What factors would affect your decision to contract into a green-certified lawn care
company? (Choose all that apply)
 How much it costs annually (1)
 The type of services provided (e.g., mowing, watering, fertilizing, etc.) (2)
 Number of visits for treatment (3)
 Type of environmentally-friendly practices (4)
 Other [please specify] (5) ____________________
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Financial incentive Treatment 4: 50% of contract (Q69 – Q72)
Q69
Congratulations!
You have been randomly selected to receive a rebate of 50% of your first year’s
annual contract fee with a green-certified lawn care company (up to $150). The rebate
is sponsored by a research grant.
Don’t miss this opportunity---this limited offer is valid only for contracts signed by May
31, 2017.
This is an actual rebate offer for you. If you contract with one of the three green-certified
lawn care companies listed at the end of this survey, you will receive the
rebate.
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Q70
How important is the rebate to your decision?
 Extremely important (1)
 Moderately important (2)
 Slightly important (3)
 Slightly unimportant (4)
 Moderately unimportant (5)
 Extremely unimportant (6)
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Q71
Given the information and rebate provided to you, how likely are you going to hire a
green-certified lawn care company to manage your lawn? (Please choose one) Note:
This is an actual rebate offer for you. If you contract with one of the three green-certified
lawn care companies listed at the end of this survey, you will receive the rebate.
 Extremely likely (1)
 Moderately likely (2)
 Slightly likely (3)
 Slightly unlikely (4)
 Moderately unlikely (5)
 Extremely unlikely (6)
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Q72
What factors would affect your decision to contract into a green-certified lawn care
company? (Choose all that apply)
 How much it costs annually (1)
 The type of services provided (e.g., mowing, watering, fertilizing, etc.) (2)
 Number of visits for treatment (3)
 Type of environmentally-friendly practices (4)
 Other [please specify] (5) ____________________
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Survey Part III: Contract (Q73 – Q81)
Q73
Part III: Contracting with a green-certified lawn care company
In this section, please tell us whether you are interested in getting more information
about green-certified lawn care companies.
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Q74
For this research project, the researchers at University of Rhode Island are collaborating
with the following three green-certified lawn care companies (in alphabetical order):
A Cut Above (http://rilawncare.com/)
Dana Designs (http://danalandscapedesigns.com/)
SeaScape (http://seascapeinc.com/)
Are you interested in signing up here to receive more information about their
services?
If you sign up, one or more of the three green-certified lawn care companies serving
your area will contact you to give you more information, including a free estimate.
 Yes, I am interested in signing up. (1)
 No, I am not interested at this time. (2)
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Display This Question:
If Would you be interested in getting lawn care services from one green certified
lawn care company? Yes Is Selected
Q75 Please leave your name, phone number and email address below. One or more of
the three green-certified lawn care companies serving your area will contact you to give
you more information.
Display This Question:
If Would you be interested in getting lawn care services from one green certified
lawn care company? Yes Is Selected
Q76 Your first name:
Display This Question:
If The researchers at the University of Rhode Island are collaborating with three
green-certified lawn c... Yes, I am interested in obtaining more information. Is Selected
Q77 Your last name:
Display This Question:
If Would you be interested in getting lawn care services from one green certified
lawn care company? Yes Is Selected
Q78 Your phone number (please include the three-digit area code):
Display This Question:
If Would you be interested in getting lawn care services from one green certified
lawn care company? <o:p></o:p> Yes Is Selected
Q79 Your email address:
Display This Question:
If The researchers at the University of Rhode Island are collaborating with three
green-certified lawn c... Yes, I am interested in obtaining more information. Is Selected
Q80 Please re-type your email address here to verify it.
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Display This Question:
If The researchers at the University of Rhode Island are collaborating with three
green-certified lawn c... No Is Selected
Q81
Would you mind telling us why you are not interested in signing up to get information
from green-certified lawn care companies? (Choose all that apply)
 I do not want to change from my current contractor. (1)
 I already have a good relationship with my current contractor. (2)
 I do not think practices by green certified lawn care companies help improve water
quality. (3)
 I do not want to give away my personal information. (4)
 Hiring a lawn care professional is too expensive. (5)
 I prefer to managing my lawn by myself. (6)
 Other [Please specify] (7) ____________________
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Survey Part IV (Q82 – Q96)
Q82
Part IV: A bit about you
In this section, we will ask a few questions about you and your household.
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Q83
What is your gender?
 Male (1)
 Female (2)
 Prefer not to answer (3)
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Q84
What is your age?
 18-24 years old (1)
 25-34 years old (2)
 35-44 years old (3)
 45-54 years old (4)
 55-64 years old (5)
 65-74 years old (6)
 75 years or older (7)
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Q85
Which of the following best describes the highest level of education you have
completed?
 Less than 12 years, no high school diploma (1)
 High School (2)
 GED (3)
 Some college (4)
 Trade Certificate (5)
 Bachelor’s Degree (6)
 Master’s degree or higher (7)
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Q86
What was your household’s total income (before taxes) in 2016?
 Less than $20,000 (1)
 $20,000 to $39,999 (2)
 $40,000 to $59,999 (3)
 $60,000 to $79,999 (4)
 $80,000 to $99,999 (5)
 $100,000 to $149,999 (6)
 $150,000 or more (7)
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Q87 Please rate the
effect
of
the
following
Very
interventions to
effective (1)
improve
water
quality in your area.

Effective (2)

Somewhat
effective (3)

Not effective
(4)

Control
industrial

pollution







Use
best
management

practices for lawn
care







Control agricultural

pollution







Clean pet waste









Manage
pollution









Manage stormwater

pollution







sewage
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Q88 Please
indicate
how
strongly
Somew
Complet
you agree
Agre hat
ely agree
or disagree
e (5) agree
(6)
with each
(4)
of
the
following
statements.

Neithe
r agree
nor
disagr
ee (3)

Somew
hat
disagree
(2)

Disagr
ee (1)

Complet
ely
disagree
(0)

We
are
approachin
g the limit
of
the

number of
people the
earth can
support.
Humans
have
the
right
to
modify the

natural
environme
nt to suit
their needs.
When
humans
interfere
with nature
it
often 
produces
disastrous
consequenc
es.
Human
ingenuity
will insure
that we do 
not make
the Earth
unlivable.
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Humans are
seriously
abusing the 
environme
nt.













The Earth
has plenty
of natural
resources if

we
just
learn how
to develop
them.













Plants and
animals
have
as

much right
as humans
to exist.













194

Q89
Please
indicate
how
strongly
you agree Complete
Agre
or
ly agree
e (5)
disagree
(6)
with each
of
the
following
statements
.

Neithe
Somewh r agree
at agree nor
(4)
disagr
ee (3)

Somewh
at
disagree
(2)

Disagr
ee (1)

Complete
ly
disagree
(0)

The
balance of
nature is
strong
enough to
cope with 
the
impacts of
modern
industrial
nations.













Despite
our
special
abilities,
，

humans
are
still
subject to
the laws of
nature.













The socalled
“ecologica
l crisis”
facing

humankin
d has been
greatly
exaggerat
ed.
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The earth
is like a
spaceship
with very 
limited
room and
resources.













Humans
were
meant to

rule over
the rest of
nature.

















































The
balance of
nature is
very

delicate
and easily
upset.
Humans
will
eventually
learn
enough

about how
nature
works to
be able to
control it.
If things
continue
on their
present
course, we
will soon 
experienc
e a major
ecological
catastroph
e.
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Q90 Check the
category on the
right that conforms
to the frequency Never (0)
with which you
have carried out
the following acts.

Once (1)

More than
Often (3)
once (2)

Very
often (4)

I have helped push
a stranger’s car out 
of the snow. (1)

























I
have
given
money to a charity. 
(4)









I
have
given
money
to
a
stranger
who 
needed it (or asked
me for it). (5)









I have donated
goods or clothes to 
a charity. (6)

























I have helped carry
a
stranger’s

belongings (books,
parcels, etc.). (9)









I have delayed an
elevator and held

the door open for a
stranger. (10)









I
have
given
directions to a 
stranger. (2)
I
have
made
change
for
a 
stranger. (3)

I
have
done
volunteer work for 
a charity. (7)
I have donated

blood. (8)

197

Q91 Check the category
on the right that conforms
Never
to the frequency with
(0)
which you have carried
out the following acts.

Once (1)

More
than
once (2)

Often (3)

Very
often (4)

I have allowed someone
to go ahead of me in a
lineup (at photocopy 
machine,
in
the
supermarket).









I have given a stranger a

lift in my car.









I have pointed out a
clerk’s error (in a bank, at
the
supermarket)
in 
undercharging me for an
item.









I have let a neighbor
whom I didn’t know too
well borrow an item of 
some value to me (e.g., a
dish, tools, etc.)









I have bought ‘charity”
Christmas
cards

deliberately because I
knew it was a good cause.









I have helped a classmate
who I did not know that
well with a homework

assignment when my
knowledge was greater
than his or hers.

































I have before being asked,
voluntarily looked after a
neighbor’s
pets
or 
children without being
paid for it.
I have offered to help a
handicapped or elderly 
stranger across a street.
I have offered my seat on
a bus or train to a stranger 
who was standing.
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I
have
helped
an
acquaintance to move 
households. (20)









Display This Question:
If Please re-type your email here to verify it. Text Response Is Empty
Q92 As a small gift, we would like to send you a $2 Amazon e-gift card. You can either
use it yourself or give it to someone by simply forwarding the email you will receive
from Amazon.com. For example, you can donate to your child’s school or other
organizations. Please leave your email address below. By typing your email below, you
give us permission to send your email to amazon.com. Make sure your email address is
typed correctly.
You can also forgo the Amazon e-gift card by simply leaving the following space
blank.
Display This Question:
If Please re-type your email here to verify it. Text Response Is Not Empty
Q93 As a small gift, we would like to send you a $2 Amazon e-gift card to the email
address you provided in Part III. You can either use it yourself or give it to someone by
simply forwarding the email. For example, you can donate to your child’s school or
other organizations. Would you like a $2 Amazon e-gift card? By choosing "Yes", you
give us permission to send your email to amazon.com.
 Yes, please email me the e-gift card. (2)
 No, thanks. (3)
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Display This Question:
If As a small gift, we would like to send you a $2 Amazon e-gift card. Please leave
your email addre... Text Response Is Not Empty
And As a small gift, we would like to send you a $2 Amazon e-gift card. Please leave
your email addre... Text Response Is Displayed
Q94
Please re-type your email here to verify it.

200

Display This Question:
If As a small gift, we would like to send you a $2 Amazon e-gift card. You can
either use it yours... Text Response Is Not Empty
Or As a small gift, we would like to send you a $2 Amazon e-gift card to the email
address you provi... Yes, please email me the e-gift card. Is Selected
Q95 We will email you a $2 Amazon e-gift card to your email address. Please sign
(type) your name below. With this signature, you assure us that:
1. You are the only person in your household who will take this survey.
2. You understand that you will receive a $2 Amazon e-gift card within one week after
you finish the survey.
3. You allow us to share your email address with amazon.com.
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Q96
Thank you for your time!
If you have additional comments, please indicate in the box below.

------------------------------------------------End of Survey -----------------------------------------------
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Appendix II: A list of organizations who distributed our survey
Quest School
Westerly Public Schools
Cranston Public Schools
Compass School
Kingston Hill Academy
Aquidneck Land Trust
Save the Bay
Environment Justice League
The Nature Conservancy
Wood-Pawcatuck Watershed Association
Woonasquatucket River Watershed Council
URI Master Gardeners
Northern Rhode Island Conservation District
Eastern RI Conservation District
RI Rivers Council
Watershed Watch
Blackstone River Watershed Association
Briggs Farm Improvement Association
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Appendix III: An example of recruitment advertisement

Passionate about water quality issues?
National Science Foundation funded survey
conducted by URI researchers will collect
information related to lawn care and water
quality. Please fill out by March 31st.
Participants receive $2 Amazon credit.
We are counting on YOU
Approved by URI’s IRB.

204

Appendix IV: Experiment instructions

Appendix 4.1: Certainty treatments
Instructions (Part I)
This experiment is a study of individual and group decision-making. If you follow these
instructions carefully and make informed decisions, you will earn money. The money
you earn will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment.
You will be in a group consisting of six players. Each player plays the role of a firm.
Your firm and five other firms are located near a lake next to a town. Anyone in the
town can access the lake to go fishing, swimming or boating.
Your firm makes money through its production. Production also generates emissions,
which affect the water quality of the lake. In general, the higher your production the
more you earn from production, but the greater the emissions your firm generates. Firm
earnings are denominated in “experimental dollars”, which will be exchanged for cash
at the end of the experiment at the rate of 2150 experimental dollars to $1.
This experiment is broken up into three parts and 100 decision “rounds”, 45 rounds in
Part I, 45rounds in Part II and 10 rounds in Part III. Each round is independent, meaning
that decisions during a round do not affect future rounds in any way. In each round your
task is to choose among six management options, labeled “A” through “F”. These
options remain constant throughout the experiment. Associated with each management
option is: (1) a production level (Production); (2) the emissions generated (Emissions);
and (3) the number of experimental dollars you earn from product sales (Earnings from
Production). Your final earnings at the end of the experiment is whatever you earn in
the 100 rounds based on you and your group members’ decisions, plus a show-up fee of
$ 5.
You have been provided the following table (Table 1) titled “Initial Earnings” that lists
the emissions, levels of production, and earnings from production that are associated
with each management option. Please refer to this table before making any decisions.
Table 1: Initial Earnings
Management Option Emissions Production
A
B
C
D
E
F

6
5
4
3
2
1

150
138
123
108
89
66
205

Earnings from production
(Experimental Dollars)
800
797
786
764
725
655

Your firm’s emissions will result in pollution in the lake. Pollution affects the wellbeing of all lake users. For example, high pollution levels affect the health of fish,
causing losses to the fisherman. To protect the water resource, an environmental
regulator requires you, and all other firms in your group, to pay the following Tax on
pollution:
Tax = 30 * Total Pollution
Total Pollution equals the total of your firm’s emissions and the other five players’
emissions. In other words, the total pollution is based on the management decision of
everyone in your group, not just your own.
A round of the experiment is complete when all six players have made their management
decision by choosing from the six management options listed on your computer screen.
After every player makes his or her management decision, Total Pollution will be
calculated by the computer. The Tax will be calculated using the formula above. For
each round, your Total Earnings is calculated as follows:
Total Earnings = Earnings from Production – Tax
Your computer will show your Management Options, your Earnings from
Production, the Total Pollution, the Tax and your Total Earnings from the current
round and all previous rounds. Your computer will also show you other five players’
Management Options after everyone makes their decision in one round.
Here is an example of how to calculate your Total Earnings. If in one round each of
five others in your group chooses option E and has an individual emission of 2 and you
choose option A and have an individual emission of 6, the Total Pollution will be 16.
Everyone in your group will pay a tax that is equal to 480 experimental dollars. Your
total earnings in this round will be 800 – 480 = 320 experimental dollars.
Here is another example. If in one round all of you choose option A and each of you
have an individual emission of 6, the Total Pollution will be 36. Everyone in your group
will pay a tax that is equal to 1080 experimental dollars. Your total earnings in this
round will be 800 – 1080 = -220 experimental dollars, which means you lose 220
experimental dollars.
It is important that you understand the instructions and the experiment. We will ask you
a few questions before you make any decisions in the experiment. The computer will
check your answers automatically. If you do not get the correct answers after a few
attempts, please let the experiment administrator know and he or she will be happy to
explain them to you.
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Please do not turn to next
page unless experimenters
ask you to do so.
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Instructions (Part II)
You will make another 45 decisions in this part. Everything in the game will keep the
same except that other firms’ management option choices in your group will not be
given to you anymore. Please also read the instructions in Part I to make any decisions
if you need it.
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Appendix 4.2: Low uncertainty treatments
Instructions (Part I)
This experiment is a study of individual and group decision-making. If you follow these
instructions carefully and make informed decisions, you will earn money. The money
you earn will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment.
You will be in a group consisting of six players. Each player plays the role of a firm.
Your firm and five other firms are located near a lake next to a town. Anyone in the
town can access the lake to go fishing, swimming or boating.
Your firm makes money through its production. Production also generates emissions,
which affect the water quality of the lake. In general, the higher your production, the
more you earn from production, but the greater the emissions your firm generates. Firm
earnings are denominated in “experimental dollars”, which will be exchanged for cash
at the end of the experiment at the rate of 1750 experimental dollars to $1.
This experiment is broken up into three parts and 100 decision “rounds”, 45 rounds in
Part I, 45rounds in Part II and 10 rounds in Part III. Each round is independent, meaning
that decisions during a round do not affect future rounds in any way. In each round your
task is to choose among six management options, labeled “A” through “F”. These
options remain constant throughout the experiment. Associated with each management
option is: (1) a production level (Production); (2) the average emissions generated
(Average Emissions); and (3) the number of experimental dollars you earn from
product sales (Earnings from Production). Your final earnings at the end of the
experiment is whatever you earn in the 100 rounds based on you and your group
members’ decisions, plus a show-up fee of $ 5.
You have been provided the following table (Table 1) titled “Initial Earnings” that lists
the emissions, levels of production, and earnings from production that are associated
with each management option. Please refer to this table before making any decisions.

Table 1: Initial Earnings
Management Option Average Emissions Production
A
B
C
D
E
F

6
5
4
3
2
1

150
138
123
108
89
66

Earnings from production
(Experimental Dollars)
800
797
786
764
725
655

In addition to the management option, you and other firms choose, a variety of
uncontrollable factors affect emissions of your firm. For example, heavy rainfall can
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increase the amount of water that flows over the land surface, increasing emissions. You
cannot control those factors. However, the average resulting emissions of each
management option can be estimated based on scientific data. For example, if you
choose management option A, emissions of your firm could be below 6 or above 6, but
on average emissions would be 6. In other words, if you choose option A many times
and calculate the average of the resulting emissions, the average will be about 6. Table
2 gives details of management options and associated probabilities of emissions.
The probabilities listed in Table 2 list the chance that a certain level of emissions are
observed. To understand these probabilities, consider a lottery machine that has 100
balls numbered 1 through 100. If randomly drawn, any one ball has a 1% chance of
being drawn because there are 100 balls. Larger probabilities can be considered by
thinking about groups of balls. For instance, there is a 50% probability of a ball being
drawn at random that has a number on it greater than 50 because half the 100 balls have
a number greater than 50. In other words, if you choose balls from the lottery many
times, about half of the balls you choose will be with numbers greater than 50.

Table 2: Probability of emissions levels and associated management options
Probabilities
Manageme
nt Option

A
B
C
D
E
F

Average
emissio
ns

Emissio
ns 0-1

Emissio
ns 1-2

6

0.04%

2.53%

5

0.15%

5.53%

4

0.58%

3

2.58%

2
1

12.79
%
59.87
%

12.21
%
26.17
%
47.08
%
35.04
%

Emissio
ns 2-3

Emissio
ns 3-4

Emissio
ns 4-5

Emissio
ns 5-6

Emissio
ns > 6

10.22
%
16.34
%
24.45
%
31.13
%
25.69
%

15.95
%
20.20
%
22.63
%
19.67
%

16.69
%
17.65
%
15.82
%
10.28
%

14.44
%
13.19
%

40.13
%
26.94
%
14.44
%

5.09%

5.09%

9.35%

3.22%

1.14%

0.72%

4.37%

0.59%

0.10%

0.02%

9.88%

0.01%

To fully understand Table 2, we further explain some examples.
Take a look at the first row. If you choose management option A in many rounds, the
emissions of your firm will be 6 on average indicated by the number in the first cell.
However, in any specific round, your firm’s emissions might be different from 6.
The second cell tells us that there is 0.04% chance that the emission level is equal or
less than 1. It means if you choose management option A in 10,000 rounds,
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approximately 4 times your firm’s emissions are less than or equal to 1. In other words,
the chance having an emission level between 0 and 1 if you choose option A is same as
the chance picking the balls numbered from 1 through 4 from a 10, 000 ball numbered
from 1 through 10,000.
The next cell shows that the chance for your firm of emitting between 1 and 2 is 2.53%.
It means the chance of having an emission level between 1 and 2 if you choose option
A is the same as the chance of picking the balls numbered from 1 through 253 from a
10, 000 ball numbered from 1 through 10,000. In other words, if you choose
management option A in 10,000 rounds, for about 253 times your firm’s emissions are
greater than 1 and less than 2.
Finally, the chance for your firm of emitting greater than 6 is 40.13%, noted by the last
cell. It means the chance of having an emission level greater than 6 if you choose option
A is the same as the chance of picking the balls numbered from 1 through 4,013 from a
10, 000 ball numbered from 1 through 10,000. In other words, if you choose
management option A in 10,000 rounds, for about 4,013 times your firm’s emissions is
greater than 6.
In general, your firm’s emissions are more likely to be lower if you choose a
management option with low average emissions. Likewise, your firm’s emissions are
more likely to be higher if you choose a management option with high average
emissions.
Your firm’s emissions will result in pollution in the lake. Pollution affects the wellbeing of all lake users. For example, high pollution levels affect the health of fish,
causing losses to fisherman. In order to protect the water resource, an environmental
regulator requires you, and all other firms in your group, to pay the following Tax on
pollution:
Tax = 30 * Total Pollution
Total Pollution equals the total of your firm’s emissions and the other five players’
emissions. In other words, the total pollution is based on the management decision of
everyone in your group, not just your own.
A round of the experiment is complete when all six players have made their management
decision by choosing from the six management options listed on your computer screen.
After every player makes his or her management decision, Total Pollution will be
calculated by the computer. The Tax will be calculated using the formula above. For
each round, your Total Earnings is calculated as follows:
Total Earnings = Earnings from Production – Tax
Your computer will show your Management Options, your Earnings from
Production, the Total Pollution, the Tax and your Total Earnings from the current
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round and all previous rounds. Your computer will also show you other five players’
Management Options after everyone makes their decision in one round.
Here is one example of how to calculate your Total Earnings. If in one round each of
five others in your group chooses option E and has an individual emission of 2 and you
choose option A and have an individual emission of 6, the Total Pollution will be 16.
Everyone in your group will pay a tax that is equal to 480 experimental dollars. Your
total earnings in this round will be 800 – 480 = 320 experimental dollars.
Here is another example. If in one round all of you choose option A and each of you
have an individual emission of 6, the total pollution will be 36. Everyone in your group
will pay a tax that is equal to 1080 experimental dollars. Your total earnings in this
round will be 800 – 1080 = -220 experimental dollars, which means you lose 220
experimental dollars.
It is important that you understand the instructions and the experiment. We will ask you
a few questions before you make any decisions in the experiment. The computer will
check your answers automatically. If you do not get the correct answers after a few
attempts, please let the experiment administrator know and he or she will be happy to
explain them to you.
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Please do not turn to next
page unless experimenters
ask you to do so.
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Instructions (Part II)
You will make another 45 decisions in this part. Everything in the game will keep the
same except that other firms’ management option choices in your group will not be
given to you anymore. Please also read the instructions in Part I to make any decisions
if you need it.
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Appendix 4.3: High uncertainty treatments
Instructions (Part I)
This experiment is a study of individual and group decision-making. If you follow these
instructions carefully and make informed decisions, you will earn money. The money
you earn will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment.
You will be in a group consisting of six players. Each player plays the role of a firm.
Your firm and five other firms are located near a lake next to a town. Anyone in the
town can access the lake to go fishing, swimming or boating.
Your firm makes money through its production. Production also generates emissions,
which affect the water quality of the lake. In general, the higher your production the
more you earn from production, but the greater the emissions your firm generates. Firm
earnings are denominated in “experimental dollars”, which will be exchanged for cash
at the end of the experiment at the rate of 1750 experimental dollars to $1.
This experiment is broken up into three parts and 100 decision “rounds”, 45 rounds in
Part I, 45rounds in Part II and 10 rounds in Part III. Each round is independent, meaning
that decisions during a round do not affect future rounds in any way. In each round your
task is to choose among six management options, labeled “A” through “F”. These
options remain constant throughout the experiment. Associated with each management
option is: (1) a production level (Production); (2) the average emissions generated
(Average Emissions); and (3) the number of experimental dollars you earn from
product sales (Earnings from Production). Your final earnings at the end of the
experiment is whatever you earn in the 100 rounds based on you and your group
members’ decisions, plus a show-up fee of $ 5.
You have been provided the following table (Table 1) titled “Initial Earnings” that lists
the emissions, levels of production, and earnings from production that are associated
with each management option. Please refer to this table before making any decisions.
Table 1: Initial Earnings
Management Option Average Emissions Production
A
B
C
D
E
F

6
5
4
3
2
1

150
138
123
108
89
66

Earnings from production
(Experimental Dollars)
800
797
786
764
725
655

In addition to the management option, you and other firms choose, a variety of
uncontrollable factors affect emissions of your firm. For example, heavy rainfall can
increase the amount of water that flows over the land surface, increasing emissions. You
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cannot control those factors. However, the average resulting emissions of each
management option can be estimated based on scientific data. For example, if you
choose management option A, emissions of your firm could be below 6 or above 6, but
on average emissions would be 6. In other words, if you choose option A many times
and calculate the average of the resulting emissions, the average will be about 6. Table
2 gives details of management options and associated probabilities of emissions.
The probabilities listed in Table 2 list the chance that a certain level of emissions are
observed. To understand these probabilities, consider a lottery machine that has 100
balls numbered 1 through 100. If randomly drawn, any one ball has a 1% chance of
being drawn because there are 100 balls. Larger probabilities can be considered by
thinking about groups of balls. For instance, there is a 50% probability of a ball being
drawn at random that has a number on it greater than 50 because half the 100 balls have
a number greater than 50. In other words, if you choose balls from the lottery many
times, about half of the balls you choose will be with numbers greater than 50.
Table 2: Probability of emissions levels and associated management options
Probabilities
Manageme
nt Option

Average
emissio
ns

A
B
C
D
E
F

6
5
4
3
2
1

Emissio
ns 0-1

Emissio
ns 1-2

Emissio
ns 2-3

Emissio
ns 3-4

Emissio
ns 4-5

Emissio
ns 5-6

Emissio
ns > 6

9.82%

17.65%

14.87%

11.42%

8.70%

6.68%

30.85%

13.36%

20.50%

15.71%

11.34%

8.24%

6.10%

24.75%

18.77%

23.57%

16.06%

10.74%

7.37%

5.22%

18.26%

27.47%

26.29%

15.38%

9.31%

5.94%

3.96%

11.64%

42.34%

26.80%

12.59%

6.62%

3.81%

2.34%

5.50%

69.15%

19.21%

6.15%

2.53%

1.22%

0.65%

1.10%

To fully understand Table 2, we further explain some examples.
Take a look at the first row. If you choose management option A in many rounds, the
emissions of your firm will be 6 on average indicated by the number in the first cell.
However, in any specific round, your firm’s emissions might be different from 6.
The second cell tells us that there is 9.82% chance that the emission level is equal or
less than 1. It means if you choose management option A in 10,000 rounds,
approximately 982 times your firm’s emissions are less than or equal to 1. In other
words, the chance having an emission level between 0 and 1 if you choose option A is
same as the chance picking the balls numbered from 1 through 982 from a 10, 000 ball
numbered from 1 through 10,000.
The next cell shows that the chance for your firm of emitting between 1 and 2 is 17.65%.
It means the chance of having an emission level between 1 and 2 if you choose option
A is the same as the chance of picking the balls numbered from 1 through 1,765 from a
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10, 000 ball numbered from 1 through 10,000. In other words, if you choose
management option A in 10,000 rounds, for about 1,765 times your firm’s emissions
are greater than 1 and less than 2.
Finally, the chance for your firm of emitting greater than 6 is 30.85%, noted by the last
cell. It means the chance of having an emission level greater than 6 if you choose option
A is the same as the chance of picking the balls numbered from 1 through 3,085 from a
10, 000 ball numbered from 1 through 10,000. In other words, if you choose
management option A in 10,000 rounds, for about 3,085 times your firm’s emissions is
greater than 6.
In general, your firm’s emissions are more likely to be lower if you choose a
management option with low average emissions. Likewise, your firm’s emissions are
more likely to be higher if you choose a management option with high average
emissions.
Your firm’s emissions will result in pollution in the lake. Pollution affects the wellbeing of all lake users. For example, high pollution levels affect the health of fish,
causing losses to the fisherman. To protect the water resource, an environmental
regulator requires you, and all other firms in your group, to pay the following Tax on
pollution:
Tax = 30 * Total Pollution
Total Pollution equals the total of your firm’s emissions and the other five players’
emissions. In other words, the total pollution is based on the management decision of
everyone in your group, not just your own.
A round of the experiment is complete when all six players have made their management
decision by choosing from the six management options listed on your computer screen.
After every player makes his or her management decision, Total Pollution will be
calculated by the computer. The Tax will be calculated using the formula above. For
each round, your Total Earnings is calculated as follows:
Total Earnings = Earnings from Production – Tax
Your computer will show your Management Options, your Earnings from
Production, the Total Pollution, the Tax and your Total Earnings from the current
round and all previous rounds. Your computer will also show you other five players’
Management Options after everyone makes their decision in one round.
Here is an example of how to calculate your Total Earnings. If in one round each of
five others in your group chooses option E and has an individual emission of 2 and you
choose option A and have an individual emission of 6, the Total Pollution will be 16.
Everyone in your group will pay a tax that is equal to 480 experimental dollars. Your
total earnings in this round will be 800 – 480 = 320 experimental dollars.
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Here is another example. If in one round all of you choose option A and each of you
have an individual emission of 6, the total pollution will be 36. Everyone in your group
will pay a tax that is equal to 1080 experimental dollars. Your total earnings in this
round will be 800 – 1080 = -220 experimental dollars, which means you lose 220
experimental dollars.
It is important that you understand the instructions and the experiment. We will ask you
a few questions before you make any decisions in the experiment. The computer will
check your answers automatically. If you do not get the correct answers after a few
attempts, please let the experiment administrator know and he or she will be happy to
explain them to you.
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Instructions (Part II)
You will make another 45 decisions in this part. Everything in the game will keep the
same except that other firms’ management option choices in your group will not be
given to you anymore. Please also read the instructions in Part I to make any decisions
if you need it.
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